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INTRODUCTION
This Essay begins with a deliberately off-putting title: extraterrito-
rial financial regulation.  Old-time “conflict of laws” scholars would
call this an oxymoron, pointing to recent Supreme Court decisions—
† John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law School
and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance.  The author acknowledges helpful
comments from Chris Brummer, Merritt Fox, Guido Ferranini, Franklin Gevurtz, Edward
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most notably, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.1 and Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2—that have applied a strong presumption
against extraterritoriality to curb the reach of U.S. law.  Even those
international law scholars who are sympathetic to the regulation of
multinational financial institutions might prefer to avoid this term
and talk instead of “global financial regulation” because they concep-
tualize international financial regulation as implemented through
networks of cooperating multinational institutions applying broad
principles of “soft law” on a consensual basis.3  Both perspectives, how-
ever, miss much, and the unfashionable word—“extraterritorial”—
cannot be avoided.4
Why not?  Four basic reasons will be given: First, major financial
institutions are extremely mobile and can easily park their higher-risk
operations abroad and beyond the regulatory reach of their home
country unless extraterritorial authority is recognized.  Second, to reg-
ulate systemic risk meaningfully, one must regulate not only domestic
financial institutions but often their counterparties as well.  This is be-
cause major financial institutions are not only “too big to fail” but also
“too interconnected to fail.”  Third, some nations will find it in their
interest to profit from regulatory arbitrage by offering underregulated
havens—i.e., “financial casinos” in this Essay’s terminology.5  These
nations, the financial services industry, and still other nations that are
1 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
2 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3 See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L
L. 683, 687 (2012) (“[T]he international [financial] regulatory architecture is one that has
been devised by domestic agencies acting through international networks, and can at best
be characterized as ‘soft’—that is, nonbinding—law.”). See also infra note 25 and accompa- R
nying text.  “Soft law” has many definitions, but a key attribute of soft law is that it is gener-
ally nonbinding (although there may be costs for noncompliance).  For a good overview,
see CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE
21ST CENTURY 111–14 (2012).
4 Several authors have recognized that the new emphasis on “soft” law, which is im-
plemented through international cooperation, represents an effort by national regulators
to find some remaining means in a globalizing world to assert authority over mobile mar-
ket participants. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from
the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 501 (2010) (suggesting a “framework for viewing
the role of national regulators as sources of international financial law”).  Others have
argued that the new emphasis on “‘mutual recognition’ and ‘global competition’” is often
a rhetoric used to mask an agenda that advances “interest group [politics]” for the benefit
of key business constituencies.  Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspec-
tive on the Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 620 (2010).  Still others
have defended the broad extraterritorial scope of the Dodd-Frank Act as necessary to pro-
tect U.S. taxpayers. See Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV. 965, 985 (2012).  Al-
though I share areas of agreement with each of these authors, this Essay will attempt to
draw distinctions in the terms of the need for an extraterritorial approach.
5 Even proponents of soft-law rulemaking have recognized that in the case of “sys-
temic risk” regulation, the costs and benefits of regulation fall very differently on different
jurisdictions.  Thus, Professor Chris Brummer writes:
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essentially passive or indifferent will resist strong soft-law standards,
preferring to keep soft law aspirational and ineffable.  Fourth and fi-
nally, the best way to get to adequate soft-law standards may be
through the assertion of extraterritorial authority by the major finan-
cial nations in order for them to gain the leverage necessary to spur
the promulgation of meaningful soft-law standards by international
bodies that will otherwise be slow to act in the absence of high consen-
sus.  Thus, this assertion of extraterritorial authority can be viewed as
an interim stage in the eventual development of meaningful soft-law
standards.
In any event, both the United States and the European Union
have asserted such extraterritorial authority, particularly with regard
to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.  In the United States, this has
been done by explicit congressional directions in the Dodd-Frank Act
that override the presumption against extraterritoriality.6  In so doing,
Some countries may, for example, be net exporters of “bad” financial prod-
ucts . . . to foreign investors.  In such instances, countries will have few
incentives to cooperate and adopt more stringent regulatory standards.
Similarly, some smaller, capital-poor countries may have few other means
than weak regulations to attract capital.  Without a better alternative for
attracting financial transactions, they may be incentivized to hope for the
best and maintain weaker standards, because they have “nothing to lose”
with regard to the rules they adopt.
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J.
257, 270 (2011) [hereinafter How International Financial Law Works].  This Essay agrees that
many nations may prefer to maintain weak regulation (i.e., to tolerate financial casinos)
because they have “‘nothing to lose.’” Id.  In general, capital-poor countries tend not to
bear the risks of financial contagion and hence have less incentive to cooperate to reduce
those risks.
6 In Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court proclaimed that “[w]hen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Morrison,
130 S. Ct. at 2878.  But the Dodd-Frank Act repeatedly indicates that it is to apply extrater-
ritorially.  In the case of swaps, Title VII contains an explicit reference to extraterritorial
application in section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act. See infra notes 51–52 and accompany- R
ing text.  Moreover, the Morrison Court also rejected any need for a “clear statement” rule
and agreed that context counts. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (“[W]e do not say . . . that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is a ‘clear statement rule,’ if by that is meant a re-
quirement that a statute say ‘this law applies abroad.’  Assuredly context can be consulted
as well.” (citations omitted)).
The Dodd-Frank Act also addressed the SEC’s authority to sue on an extraterritorial
basis for securities fraud.  Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act added both section
27(b) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 22(c) to the Securities Act of
1933 to restore the Second Circuit’s former “conduct or effects” test (but only for SEC, not
private, actions). See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-
Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1862–63 (2010) (spelling out these changes).
To date, cases have divided on whether section 929P(b) did effectively achieve its purpose.
Compare SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that section 929P
did restore SEC’s jurisdiction to assert Rule 10b-5 extraterritorially), with SEC v. A Chi.
Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908, 916–17 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding that
section 929P does not necessarily restore the prior Second Circuit case law, without decid-
ing the question).  This topic is beyond the scope of this Essay, which examines only sub-
stantive financial regulation, not antifraud litigation.
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Congress was responding to the challenge posed by the 2008 collapse
of American International Group, Inc. (AIG), then the largest insur-
ance company in the United States, whose sudden insolvency in 2008
in the face of margin calls from its counterparties overshadowed even
the failure of Lehman Brothers and eventually necessitated a U.S.-gov-
ernmental bailout of $182.5 billion in loans.7  Operating in opaque
and unregulated OTC derivatives markets, neither AIG nor its
counterparties required the other to post margin as collateral for their
obligations, even though (i) credit default swaps were inherently long-
term obligations that exposed both sides to substantial credit risk, and
(ii) much shorter-term trading transactions on exchanges often would
have been subject to regulatory requirements that necessitated the
posting of collateral.  As a result, when AIG’s position on the brink of
insolvency became evident in 2008, its counterparties belatedly made
margin calls that were well beyond AIG’s ability to comply.  Faced with
the threat of a likely worldwide financial contagion if AIG was also
forced into bankruptcy, the U.S. government responded by extending
credit to AIG and guaranteeing its obligations to its counterparties.
To an angry Congress, the lessons of the AIG debacle were multiple:
(1) enormous liabilities could be hidden in nontransparent OTC mar-
kets; (2) subsidiaries and affiliates of major U.S.-based financial insti-
tutions could take on an unacceptable level of risk through offshore
activities (as AIG had done through an unregulated UK subsidiary);
and (3) major market participants could persist in the unrealistic per-
ception that they were protected against risk because of de facto insur-
ance purchased in this OTC market.  In short, even more than the
Lehman bankruptcy, the AIG debacle demonstrated the dangers of
regulatory arbitrage and the need for controls on systemic risk.
Congress also recognized that large financial institutions would
likely again pursue regulatory arbitrage (once the dust settled) and
that international standards curbing systemic risk were largely lacking.
Worse yet, meaningful reform on the international level faced inter-
minable delays before a sufficient international consensus could be
reached.  Like the Holy Grail, international consensus is more sought
than discovered, and the quest might continue indefinitely.  Knowing
7 For a good overview of this bailout, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945 (2009).  For contemporary accounts of the federal govern-
ment’s intervention at AIG, which occurred just three days after Lehman’s bankruptcy, see
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2008, at A1; Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Throwing a Lifeline to a Troubled
Giant: Fed’s Bailout of A.I.G. Came After Frantic Search for Rescuer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at
C1.  For the $185 billion figure, see Joe Nocera, Hearings That Aren’t Just Theater, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2010, at B1.
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all this, Congress opted for an extraterritorial reach for much of the
Dodd-Frank Act.8
In a much quieter fashion, the EU has reached a similar recogni-
tion and has also asserted extraterritorial authority.  Here, a major
irony surfaces: although the United States has received considerable
criticism for its expressly extraterritorial approach, the EU has
adopted a nearly equivalent position with regard to OTC derivatives,
with almost identical language.9
This assessment does not deny that the assertion of extraterrito-
rial authority will produce friction.  Such friction was abundantly evi-
dent in recent negotiations between the United States and the EU
over the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms, particu-
larly with respect to cross-border swaps.  On the U.S. side, fear was
expressed that, absent broad extraterritorial coverage, major financial
institutions could simply park their higher-risk operations outside the
United States and thereby effectively escape the principal reforms in-
tended by the Dodd-Frank Act.10  On the European side, there was
8 See Greenberger, supra note 4, at 968–69. R
9 Although U.S. banking lobbyists and other critics of U.S. policy regularly portray
U.S. financial regulators as uniquely and arrogantly applying our law extraterritorially, the
EU has actually done much the same over the same time period.  The basic EU legal re-
gime for cross-border swaps trading is set forth in the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR), which was adopted in 2012 and is further discussed infra at note 80. R
Much like Dodd-Frank, EMIR will also regulate trades between non-EU entities when such
trading has a “‘direct, substantial and foreseeable effect’ within the EU or where to do so is
necessary to guard against anti-evasion.”  Barnabas W.B. Reynolds et al., United States: Ac-
tions Required Under Derivative Reforms, MONDAQ (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/256316/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/Actions+Required+
Under+Derivatives+Reforms.  This language largely parallels the language in section
722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.  For a detailed R
and somewhat critical review of EMIR and related initiatives, see Guido Ferrarini & Paolo
Saguato, Reforming Securities and Derivatives Trading in the EU: From EMIR to MIFIR, 13 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 319, 357–59 (2013).
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European securities reg-
ulator, published a consultation paper on July 17, 2013, indicating the standards that it
would use to prevent the evasion of EMIR by non-EU counterparties, which paper again
parallels the issuance of similar interpretive guidance by the CFTC and the SEC. EUROPEAN
SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, CONSULTATION PAPER: DRAFT REGULATORY TECHNICAL
STANDARDS ON CONTRACTS HAVING A DIRECT, SUBSTANTIAL AND FORESEEABLE EFFECT WITHIN
THE UNION AND NON-EVASION OF PROVISIONS OF EMIR (2013), available at http://www.esma.
europa.eu/bg/system/files/2013-892_draft_rts_of_emir.pdf.  ESMA’s paper was open to
comment and consultation until September 16, 2013.
Still, the key point here is that the EU and the United States are following very similar,
parallel courses of actions, both looking to the impact of extraterritorial trading on their
own jurisdiction and the potential for evasion. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. R
10 At the open meeting of the CFTC on July 12, 2013, at which the “cross border final
guidance” was approved, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler emphasized in his initial statement
the danger that large U.S. financial institutions could and did trade through offshore sub-
sidiaries and affiliates, particularly ones organized in unregulated jurisdictions, such as the
Cayman Islands.  Specifically, he stressed in this statement that: (1) “the U.S.’s largest
banks each have somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 legal entities around the globe”;
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equivalent concern that the U.S. approach ignored national sover-
eignty and represented an alleged return to a prior tradition of U.S.
imperialism under which the United States assumed that its preferred
financial practices could be mandated for the rest of the world.11
Nonetheless, compromises were reached—imperfect and provi-
sional though they were.  Throughout this bruising and hard-nosed
negotiation process, the major international networking institutions—
the IMF, the World Bank, the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the Fi-
nancial Stability Board12—remained largely on the sidelines, with the
real bargaining being between U.S. regulators and an EU commis-
sioner.13  That bargaining centered on a new concept that is still
unique to this financial regulatory context: “substituted compli-
ance.”14  Under it, the critical question becomes whether U.S. law and
the host country’s law are “functionally equivalent.”15  If they are, U.S.-
based entities, acting extraterritorially, are deemed to comply with
U.S. law by complying instead with the host country’s law.  Such an
(2) some U.S. banks “have hundreds of legal entities just in the Cayman Islands alone”; (3)
“Lehman Brothers had [its] 3,300 legal entities”; (4) Citigroup’s “structured investment
vehicles . . . were set up in the Cayman Islands[ ] [and] run out of London;” and (5) Bear
Stearns’ “sinking hedge funds . . . were organized in the jurisdiction of the Cayman Is-
lands.”  Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,371 (July 26, 2013).
11 By 2012, some in the financial press were asserting that “[t]he United States is
coming to be seen as a global threat, acting unilaterally with aggressive new market
rules . . . . [with] [t]he new buzzword . . . [being] ‘extraterritoriality’, or ET.”  Huw Jones,
ET, the New Alien Scaring Global Markets, REUTERS, Feb. 5, 2012, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/02/05/us-financial-regulation-et-idUSTRE8140DV20120205.  As
late as September 2013, the European press was continuing to warn that CFTC “imperial-
ism” was threatening a global deal.  Tom Braithwaite et al., U.S. Rules “Endanger” Derivatives
Reforms: CFTC ‘Imperialism’ Threatens Global Deal, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at 1.  Some
respected U.S. commentators have agreed with this assessment that the CFTC has over-
reached. See Edward F. Greene & Ilona Potiha, Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of
Dodd-Frank’s Derivatives and Clearing Rules, the Impact on Global Markets and the Inevitability of
Cross-Border and US Domestic Coordination, 8 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 338 (2013) [hereinafter
Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank].  I agree as to the need in particular for
U.S. and European coordination but believes that the concept of “substituted compliance”
is too empty of substantive content to be the guiding light for that process.
12 For a recent overview of these transnational bodies, see Stavros Gadinis, The Finan-
cial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 157,
158–61 (2013).
13 Commissioner Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets
and Services, was the point person negotiating with the CFTC on behalf of Europe. See
Press Release, CFTC, The European Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path
Forward on Derivatives (July 11, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press
Releases/pr6640-13.
14 For articles introducing and advocating this concept, see Ethiopis Tafara & Robert
J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007); Edward F. Greene & Ilona Potiha, Examining the Extraterrito-
rial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule and Margin Rules for Uncleared Swaps—A Call for Regula-
tory Coordination and Cooperation, 7 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 271 (2012) [hereinafter Examining
the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule]; see also Issues in the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of Dodd-Frank, supra note 11. R
15 See Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank, supra note 11, at 338. R
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approach still involves an assertion of extraterritorial authority (as
U.S. law would preempt the host country’s law if the two bodies of law
were not deemed functionally equivalent), but it is far more palatable
and has been enthusiastically supported in Europe and elsewhere.
Still, its growing acceptance necessarily leads to further questions:
What are the costs of substituted compliance?  Despite the eager, even
euphoric, acceptance of substituted compliance within the financial
services community and abroad, this Essay will assert that the concept
has not yet received the critical scrutiny it needs.  Sometimes, its costs
may outweigh its benefits.
Equally importantly, the attitude of U.S. financial regulators to-
ward substituted compliance has been almost schizophrenic.  Unlike
securities and derivatives regulators, banking regulators have largely
ignored or disdained substituted compliance, preferring to rely on a
more traditional territorial approach.16  This disparity also needs
justification.
Beyond this initial question of the costs and benefits associated
with substituted compliance, the broader issue that this Essay ad-
dresses is how successful international collaboration among nations
on financial regulation can best be achieved.  Unquestionably, such
collaboration is needed, and an “imperialistic” approach by the
United States would be resisted.  For some time, the consensus among
students of international relations was to rely on soft law with respect
to issues of financial regulation—that is, broad, noncompulsory, and
sometimes aspirational, principles that are announced by interna-
tional bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World
Bank.  But the 2008 financial crisis required quicker and more force-
ful action than the processes of soft law can achieve.
Today, there is an alternative: “minilateralism.”17 As opposed to
“multilateralism,” minilateralism asks what is the smallest number of
nations needed to reach a workable solution to a specific problem.
While a multilateral agreement may take a decade or more to negoti-
ate (if the process is successful),18 a “minilateral” solution can come
16 See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Volcker Rule).  For a R
good summary of the Federal Reserve’s case for a more aggressively extraterritorial ap-
proach toward foreign banks and foreign branches of U.S. banks, see Daniel K. Tarullo,
Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulating Large Foreign Banking Organizations, Speech at
the Harvard Law School Symposium on Building the Financial System of the Twenty-First
Century: An Agenda for Europe and the United States (Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140327a.htm.
17 This term was coined by Moisés Naı́m, the longtime editor of Foreign Policy. See
Moisés Naı́m, Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, FOREIGN POL-
ICY (June 22, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/minilateralism.
18 Moisés Naı́m notes, for example, that the “last successful multilateral trade agree-
ment dates back to 1994” and that the “last significant international nonproliferation
agreement was in 1995.” Id.
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much quicker through bilateral or limited multilateral negotiation.
This Essay will assert the superiority of a “minilateral” approach to
issues of financial regulation.  In its view, soft-law processes will not
work when the financial services industry wishes to resist reform and
when other nations benefit from regulatory arbitrage.  Thus, the re-
cent cross-border swaps drama will likely play out again—sometimes
with different participants, sometimes with different results, but usu-
ally with the same clash of interests.
This preference for a “minilateral” approach and the retention of
a measure of extraterritorial financial regulation rests in part on skep-
ticism about the slow pace and imprecise generalities of soft law,
which rarely will confine a determined financial services industry.
Even more, it rests on the fact that only the major financial nations
have the right incentives to control systemic risk.19  The major finan-
cial nations—mainly the United States and Europe—suffered from
the 2008 crisis, while other nations with less developed financial infra-
structures largely escaped damage.20  This distinction is relevant be-
cause those countries most injured in the 2008 contagion should be
more motivated to prevent a repetition, while those that escaped in-
jury may be more interested in profiting from regulatory arbitrage.
To be sure, the proponents of soft law may insist that the United
States can no longer rule the world, and some of them will add that
even if Dodd-Frank gives U.S. regulators authority to regulate on an
extraterritorial basis, the United States cannot effectively exercise that
authority in the face of unified international opposition.21  To some
extent, this is true.  Aggressive U.S. attempts at extraterritorial regula-
tion have failed in the past (most notably in the antitrust context).22
19 See How International Financial Law Works, supra note 5 at 309 (“[W]ealthier devel- R
oped countries generally have more at stake in complex financial rule making.”).
20 See Bruno Wenn, “Exceedingly High Interest Rates,” DANDC.EU (Jan. 25, 2013), http://
www.dandc.eu/en/article/european-bank-regulators-would-do-well-learn-their-latin-american-counter-
parts (noting that “developing countries and emerging countries [fared] surprisingly well
in the [2008 financial] crisis”).
21 See, e.g., Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank, supra note 11, at 341–42 R
(explaining how the approach of the CFTC in Dodd-Frank, which was “initially perceived
to be aggressive . . . led to the unusual development of countries and foreign regulators
commenting publicly and critically to U.S. agencies,” forcing the CFTC to respond with
“updated approaches”).
22 Several decades ago, the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act (princi-
pally through private antitrust litigation) led to the passage of blocking laws and “claw-
back” legislation in Europe and elsewhere, which legislation was intended to nullify the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. See, e.g., John H. Chung, The International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1996) (summarizing the development
of Sherman Act jurisdictional issues in U.S courts and critical responses); P.C.F. Pettit &
C.J.D. Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Anti-
trust Laws, 37 BUS. L. 697 (1982) (surveying such legislation). Cf. In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (noting that nine foreign defendants failed to
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Still, the United States is not likely to attempt to ride roughshod
over the rest of the world.  Instead, it appears increasingly likely that a
compromise will be reached through the interpretation of the new
doctrine of substituted compliance.  Substituted compliance remains,
however, a new and elusive concept whose proper application lies
largely in the eye of the beholder.  At worst, it could enable the finan-
cial services industry to achieve an effective end run around the Dodd-
Frank Act’s requirements.  Conversely, as will be seen, the Federal Re-
serve Board has largely disdained the concept, and the newly adopted
Volcker Rule takes no note of it, relying instead on traditional territo-
rial concepts by which to divide regulatory authority.23
Against this unsettled backdrop, this Essay will advance two con-
tentions: First, for substituted compliance to work, the ground rules
on what is allowable must be set by those nations with the right incen-
tives—namely, those that are truly exposed to systemic risk.  Second,
because they do have the right incentives, the United States and the
EU need to be proactive in opening such a “minilateral” dialogue to
define what should constitute sufficient functional equivalence to sat-
isfy “substantial compliance.”  Procedurally, they should first agree
and then approach other major players to sign onto their standards,
rather than await a global consensus and universal harmonization.
Why?  Economically, the United States and the EU have the best in-
centives for controlling systemic risk because they will likely bear the
lion’s share of the costs from a financial contagion (and thus they will
invest more in controls to avoid one).  Other nations can largely avoid
those costs.  As a result, if the world must wait for all nations to con-
verge on a single, universal standard, the likely end product will be
delayed, weaker, and easier to evade.24
The foregoing arguments for a minilateral approach that stresses
bilateral negotiations and binding law rest on an economic founda-
tion that needs to be stated at the outset.  Somewhat naively, the pro-
ponents of soft law have tended to view financial regulation as simpler
than other forms of international regulation and as presenting mere
appear, answer, or plead to the antitrust complaint).  That episode involved, however, a
more extreme clash between the substantive policies of the United States and its principal
allies than anything posed by existing differences in derivatives regulation.
23 See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. R
24 To this point, the United States has avoided placing the topic of financial regula-
tion reform on the table for international negotiation, in particular by refusing to include
it on the agenda for currently ongoing international trade talks.  The Financial Times re-
ports that the United States has resisted “including a framework for financial regulatory
convergence in the talks” because of a concern that “the talks could be used by banks to
circumvent tough rules stemming from the 2010 Dodd-Frank law, and as a way for Europe-
ans to delay their own reforms.” See James Politi & Alex Barker, White House Set for Wall
Street Clash Over Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2013, at 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN601.txt unknown Seq: 10 22-SEP-14 8:24
1268 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1259
coordination problems.25  This overlooks the very strong incentives
for regulatory arbitrage.  Financial regulation has distributional conse-
quences, and different legal rules create different winners and losers.
Moreover, because nonbinding soft law is unenforceable, it is easier
for an adversely affected nation to defect and ignore its prior commit-
ments.26  As a result, to insist that soft law be kind and gentle or give
each nation an equal voice is to state rules that ensure financial regu-
lation will be ineffective.
Ultimately, systemic risk presents a classic “public goods” prob-
lem.27  All nations want systemic stability, but most would prefer that
others pay the cost of maintaining it.  Unless compelled, many nations
would rather “free ride,” looking to the United States and the EU in
the event of a financial contagion to fund the costs of a global bailout
to forestall a global depression.  Clearly, a financial contagion any-
where in the world could spread across borders and affect all major
markets.  But not all nations need to internalize the costs of a systemic
risk crisis, as its impact is uneven.28  In addition, a nation that persists
25 International law scholars have conceptualized international financial law as
presenting simply a coordination problem because they assume that national financial reg-
ulators share the same purposes and premises. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring,
Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 211, 217–20 (2006).  Simi-
larly minded academics often make the assumption that international financial law is an
area of “‘low politics.’”  Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Trans-
governmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5, 28–29 (2002).
But once we recognize that international financial law has distributive consequences, these
premises become untenable.  For a critique of these views, see How International Financial
Law Works, supra note 5, at 260–61. See also infra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. R
26 See How International Financial Law Works, supra note 5, at 271 (noting that “soft law R
should provide little utility as a means of making credible commitments” because nations
will defect from informal commitments when it is in their interest to do so).
27 For an overview of the economics of public goods, see William H. Oakland, Theory
of Public Goods, in 2 A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 485, 485–99, 502–22 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 (1971).  By definition, public
goods share at least two characteristics: (1) they are “nonexcludable,” meaning that pro-
ducers cannot provide their benefits to one consumer without providing it to others, and
(2) consumption by one consumer does not reduce the supply available for others.  The
classic textbook example of a public good is the lighthouse: no one can be excluded from
using it, and use by one does not affect the supply for others.  Because those who enjoy
public goods do not necessarily pay for them, public goods cannot be easily financed by
the private market, as “free riders” can escape payment.  To finance public goods, these
free riders must be taxed. Cf. id. at 14–15.  In our context, protection against systemic risk
benefits all (to varying degrees), but the costs do not fall equally or proportionally and are
avoided by the free riders.
28 Smaller nations without large financial institutions based in them have less to fear
from financial contagion.  Even some major nations—Australia, Canada, Brazil, Japan—
suffered much less from the 2008–2009 financial contagion than did the United States and
the EU. See, e.g., Chris Zappone, Australia Dodges Recession, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June
3, 2009), www.smh.com.au/business/australia-dodges-recession-20090603-buyq.html. Cf.
Bulent Gokay, The 2008 World Economic Crisis: Global Shifts and Faultlines, GLOBAL RESEARCH
(Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-2008-world-economic-crisis-global-
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with laxer, more permissive rules may be able to attract business and
profit as a result of the regulatory arbitrage that predictably would
follow.29  Given this asymmetry (i.e., some nations can profit from lax
regulation without necessarily having to face high costs from a finan-
cial contagion), resistance can be anticipated to rules that heighten
global standards to guard against systemic risk.  Because any nation—
developed or undeveloped—can potentially offer its jurisdiction as a
forum for unregulated (or laxly regulated) trading, we can expect that
underregulated markets will persist.
A key assertion of this Essay is that, under these circumstances, all
the preconditions necessary for a “tragedy of the commons” are pre-
sent.30  In particular, because (1) other nations cannot be excluded
from offering “financial casinos” to those desiring to trade on them,
and (2) many nations do not have to internalize the costs they impose
on others, some nations will behave as “free riders,” preferring that
others bear the costs and encouraging regulatory arbitrage when it
benefits them.  All this is predictable from the “tragedy of the com-
mons” perspective, which has long been the basic paradigm by which
environmental law scholars explained the depletion of natural re-
sources.31  More recently, legal scholars have extended this perspec-
tive to explain problems with public infrastructure (such as
communication, transportation, and healthcare systems).32  A few pio-
neers have even noted its applicability to financial markets.33  Still, be-
shifts-and-faultlines/12283 (comparing the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on different
economies).  In this light, CFTC Chairman Gensler’s repeated focus on the Cayman Is-
lands at least identifies a legitimate problem (even if it is unlikely that trading in OTC
derivatives would migrate there). See supra note 10. R
29 For the similar view of Professor Brummer, see How International Financial Law
Works, supra note 5, at 267. R
30 The tragedy of the commons is a standard law and economics problem which arises
when (i) it is impossible to exclude actors from using a resource or engaging in an activity
(nonexcludability), and (ii) some actors do not have to internalize the costs they impose
on others. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45
(1968).  Normally, the result of such a “tragedy” is overuse of a common resource (such as
overgrazed fields, depleted fisheries, or polluted air).  Here, an inability to exclude U.S.-
based entities from trading in foreign markets produces a related result: risky activities
increase until a financial disaster strikes.  Substituted compliance can in this light be
viewed as a means of excluding U.S.-based entities from a dangerous activity that is made
possible because other nations do not internalize its foreseeable costs.
31 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 144–57, 173–79 (1990) (examining fisheries and other natu-
ral resources).
32 See Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and Their
Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 413 (2008) (applying this perspec-
tive to transportation infrastructure); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 272–73, 281–82, 293–98 (2007) (applying this perspective to IP
(or “innovation”) and communications infrastructure, respectively).
33 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 386 (2008); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulat-
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cause the critical economic precondition to a “tragedy of the
commons” is nonexcludability, this perspective applies with the great-
est force to financial markets when we move to the international con-
text.  To be sure, the participants who trade on any single market (say,
the New York Stock Exchange) can exclude those among them who
do not play by their rules.  Governance structures (administrative
agencies, such as the SEC, or liability rules) can also be devised by any
single country to prevent a “tragedy of the commons” so long as they
focus only on domestic activities and transactions.  But once traders
and other market participants can flee to a foreign jurisdiction, then
(and only then) the precondition of nonexcludability is satisfied.
Once we accept the relevance of the “tragedy of the commons”
perspective, a major implication is that, unless binding law can be gen-
erated, the major financial nations that most bear the costs of systemic
risk will be frustrated and disarmed because they cannot bar trading
outside their borders.  Conversely, if the leading nations can agree on
common standards, they can then effectively deal with the free riders
by simply denying their own financial institutions the ability to trade
in markets that do not comply with their standards.  Bluntly put, the
United States and the EU together have the market power to achieve
this result.
One need not accept every step in this reasoning to reach the
same bottom line.  Assume instead that, without trying to lead a race
to the bottom in regulation, some nations may simply tolerate loosely
regulated markets to function within their jurisdiction,34 either out of
indifference or because they assume that the major nations would bail
everyone out in the event of a financial contagion (as more or less
happened in 2008).  These less-regulated jurisdictions are essentially
free riders, who are expecting (perhaps shrewdly) other nations to
bear the costs (including the costs of massive bailouts) of preserving
economic stability from systemic risk.  These free riders may be aided
and abetted in their resistance (or at least indifference) to the need
for stronger regulation by precisely those large financial institutions
that most want to escape stronger regulation.  In a globalized world,
market participants are extremely mobile and can escape confining
regulation so long as they can delay the major financial nations from
acting.  Rhetorically, those opposed to financial reform can unite
around a favorite defensive rallying cry, which is that international
regulation must not precede consensus.
ing the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 174 (2011) (arguing through-
out that “‘commons’ literature offers guidance for developing a governance model that
better reflects normative expectations regarding the rights and responsibilities [in the]
financial market system”).
34 See How International Financial Law Works, supra note 5, at 267. R
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As with other public-goods problems, public policy needs to find
a way to tax the free riders, which here include those nations willing
to tolerate unregulated financial markets.  This Essay will consider
means to this end but will basically suggest that the major financial
nations have to bar their own financial institutions (and their offshore
affiliates) from trading in those foreign markets that lack adequate
regulation in order to protect themselves from a systemic-risk crisis.
That prescription is at odds with the sovereignty-respecting or consen-
sus-demanding perspectives of many international law scholars.35
Translated back into the language of international law, this prescrip-
tion insists both that noncompulsory soft law is not sufficient and that
the broad, aspirational general principles that international networks
can develop will only allow mobile market participants to continue
business as usual.  Instead, harder bargaining in minilateral negotia-
tions is needed, and only the nations that will bear the ultimate costs
of contagion have the incentives to get the rules right.
Realism counsels, however, that the United States cannot unilat-
erally impose its policy preferences on the rest of the world.  It needs
therefore to be selective.  When is it most necessary for it to assert
itself on an extraterritorial basis?  This Essay focuses on the public-
goods perspective because it can supply an answer.  That is, it can pro-
vide a rationale for a more aggressive approach to extraterritorial fi-
nancial regulation that applies to some cases but not all.  Line drawing
is necessary, but it should be based on principles, and this perspective
generates principled distinctions.
This Essay will focus on two very different examples of interna-
tional financial regulation that each seek to curb systemic risk but oth-
erwise contrast sharply.  It will begin by surveying the recent
controversy over the efforts of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to regulate cross-border swaps trading on an extraterritorial ba-
sis.  Then, it will turn to the even more controversial Volcker Rule,
which bars major financial institutions (both domestic institutions and
foreign ones that have a branch in the United States) from engaging
in proprietary trading or owning or sponsoring a hedge fund.36
35 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 25, at 3 (noting that one side of the debate “asserts R
that . . . the state is not declining in power or importance” and government actors are
“increasingly networking with their counterparts abroad”).
36 The final regulations implementing the Volcker Rule were jointly issued by the
Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission on December 10, 2013.  They became effective on April 1, 2014—
subject to a conformance period ending on July 21, 2015. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1;
File No. S7-41-11, RIN 3235-AL07 (Dec. 10, 2013) (“Prohibitions and Restrictions on Pro-
prietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Funds”), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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These two examples were chosen because they differ in significant
ways.  The SEC’s and CFTC’s efforts at regulating swaps and other
over-the-counter derivatives grew out of a G-20 summit where interna-
tional consensus was achieved as to the need for such regulation.37  In
contrast, the Volcker Rule is a uniquely American innovation without
any parallel rule in other major financial nations.  Whether for this or
other reasons, the two rules have very different extraterritorial reaches
and are likely to produce very different costs and benefits.
I
THE CROSS-BORDER SWAPS DILEMMA
A. The OTC Derivatives Market
If the 2008 financial crisis carried any message about the neces-
sary shape of financial reform, it was that the over-the-counter deriva-
tives market posed special risks to global financial stability.  First, the
outstanding notional amount of these OTC derivatives contracts, ex-
ceeding $700 trillion as of 2011, dwarfed even the bond market.38
Second, while all securities and derivatives carry market risk, OTC de-
rivatives are uniquely also subject to counterparty risk: namely, the
danger that a pivotal counterparty may be unable to make good on its
promised performance (which was, of course, the AIG experience).39
Third, because of the bilateral nature of these privately negotiated
contracts, they are inherently opaque as to pricing, volume, and the
identity of the parties involved; thus, they carry a greater risk of un-
foreseen financial contagion.40  Finally, unlike exchange-traded deriv-
atives, which are highly standardized and subject to initial- and
variation-margin requirements, the collateralization of OTC deriva-
tives is determined by individual negotiation.41  In a competitive mar-
ket, swap dealers may compete (wisely or unwisely) by reducing the
margin that they require from their counterparties.  Particularly dur-
ing a bubble, too little margin may be required to generate an ade-
quate safety net in later times of market stress.
All this was clear to the U.S. Congress, which by 2010 (the year of
the Dodd-Frank Act) knew three things very well: (1) AIG’s failure
had been precipitated by margin calls from its counterparties that
37 See Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd–Frank’s Volcker Rule, supra note 14, at R
271–72 & n.2.
38 For this estimate, see Jan D. Luettringhaus, Regulating Over-the-Counter Derivatives in
the European Union – Transatlantic (Dis)Harmony After EMIR and Dodd-Frank: The Impact on
(Re)Insurance Companies and Occupational Pension Funds, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 19, 20
(2012).  This figure reduces, however, to $20 trillion if all such contracts were settled and
closed out simultaneously. Id.
39 See id. at 20–21.
40 See id. at 20, 25.
41 See id. at 20.
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could not be satisfied;42 (2) AIG’s collapse had necessitated a $182
billion bailout borne by the American taxpayer;43 and (3) AIG’s credit
default swaps had been written by a foreign subsidiary (based in the
U.K.) that was effectively unregulated.44  From the outset, this AIG
experience inclined the U.S. Congress toward an extraterritorial ap-
proach; Congress did not want to be burnt twice by foreign affiliates of
U.S. financial institutions entering into imprudent and unregulated
OTC transactions.
The G-20 leaders recognized the need to address OTC derivatives
as a special priority at their 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, where they
agreed to impose clearing, reporting, and risk-mitigation require-
ments on OTC derivative transactions.45  The use of clearinghouses
implied standardized margin levels for exchange-traded derivatives
(and thus the effective elimination of counterparty risk), but specially
tailored OTC derivatives are too individualized to be capable of trad-
ing on exchanges or clearing through clearinghouses.  For these
transactions, risk-mitigation rules (including margin levels) would
have to be specified.
This was not a minor problem for at least two reasons: First, banks
and other major swap dealers had profited handsomely from trading
derivatives on an over-the-counter basis because such trading is
opaque and hence less subject to competitive pressure.46  Swap deal-
ers have incentives to resist efforts to enhance transparency by con-
verting specialized contracts into more standardized contracts that
could trade openly on exchanges.  Put simply, transparency implies
increased competition, which would in turn erode away the economic
rents that swap dealers earned on privately negotiated transactions.
Second, the OTC derivatives market, centered in London, is highly
international in character.  By some estimates, 55–75 percent of the
total derivatives exposure of U.S. banks was to foreign entities.47  In-
deed, in the extreme case of credit default swaps (CDSs), only approx-
imately 7 percent of U.S. single-name CDS transactions in 2011 were
42 See Sjostrom, supra note 7, at 961–62. R
43 See Greenberger, supra note 4, at 976. R
44 See id. at 976–77.
45 The G-20 nations convened their Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 to address
the 2008 financial crisis.  Their Pittsburgh Summit Preamble called for “‘enhanced and
expanded . . . scope of regulation and oversight, with tougher regulation of over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives, securitization markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge
funds.’” Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, supra note 14, at 272 R
n.2 (quoting Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/documents/pittsburgh_
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf).
46 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 45–51
(2011) (detailing the relationship between the rising profitability of the OTC derivatives
market and its lack of transparency).
47 See Luettringhaus, supra note 38, at 26 & n.57. R
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between two U.S.-domiciled counterparties, with the rest involving a
foreign counterparty.48  Thus, as the SEC recently noted, “cross-bor-
der transactions are the norm, not the exception.”49
Next, regulatory reform had to address the problem of geo-
graphic uncertainty.  Because OTC derivatives are not traded on ex-
changes, they do not have any clear-cut geographic location.  Swap
transactions can be between participants in two different countries,
booked in a third country, and risk-managed in a fourth country.
Hence, swap transactions do not need to be based in the United States
and could easily be moved offshore—if such a migration would allow
the swap dealer to escape regulation.  Thus, the incentive to engage in
regulatory arbitrage is uniquely high, and an angry Congress decided
in the Dodd-Frank Act to respond by deeming U.S. law to apply if a
U.S. entity was involved.50
B. The Congressional Response
Given this background, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
focuses on the derivatives markets, adopted several provisions aimed
at foreign entities that have seldom, if ever, been seen before in U.S.
financial regulation.  For example, section 715 (“Authority to Prohibit
Participation in Swap Activities”) provides that, with certain
exceptions,
if the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the Securities
and Exchange Commission determines that the regulation of swaps
or security-based swaps markets in a foreign country undermines
the stability of the United States financial system, either Commis-
sion, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, may pro-
hibit an entity domiciled in the foreign county from participating in
the United States in any swap or security-based swap activities.51
Effectively, this was a shot across the bow for other nations, and its
message was blunt: mess with the United States and your financial in-
stitutions (and others) will be barred from our swaps markets!
Similarly, section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act broadly amended
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to provide that the new Dodd-
Frank Act provisions do not apply extraterritorially
unless [swap] activities—
48 See Exchange Act Release No. 34-69490 (“Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activi-
ties; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Regis-
tration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants”), 78
Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,976 (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal].
49 Id.
50 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
§ 722(d), 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2012).
51 15 U.S.C. § 8304 (2012).  Section 715 does contain an exception if certain findings
are made under section 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6. Id.
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(1) have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or
effect on, commerce of the United States; or
(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may
prescribe or promulgate as are necessary or appropriate to pre-
vent the evasion of any provision of this Act that was enacted by
the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010.52
This statutory language represents an extreme case of the exception
swallowing the rule: the Dodd-Frank Act does not apply extraterritori-
ally, except to activities that are “significant” or “evasive.”  Add to this
the Act’s extremely broad definitions of “swap dealer” and “major
swap participant,” which ignore the domicile of the entities and focus
instead on the size of the positions they hold, the potential exposure
they create, and their degree of leverage,53 and it becomes clear from
the outset that Title VII would sweep very broadly beyond the United
States.  Yet, although it has received much less attention, the E.U.’s
recent key trading regulation, the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR), has an equally broad sweep and uses virtually the
same tests.54
Structurally, Title VII of Dodd-Frank sought to reduce systemic
risk through a variety of strategies.  First, Title VII repealed parts of
the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which had de-
regulated the OTC derivatives market.55  Title VII then divided the
field so as to give the CFTC jurisdiction over swaps and the SEC juris-
diction over the much smaller world of “security-based swaps.”56  Or-
ganizationally, Title VII mandated two types of rules: (1) entity-level
rules (which, for example, require registration of “swap dealers” and
“major swap participants”) and (2) transaction-based rules, which reg-
ulate individual swap transactions (including through rules regulating
capital, margin, risk management, clearing, and trading).57  Our focus
will be on these latter rules that attempt to prevent another AIG-style
debacle by specifying mandatory risk-mitigation strategies for OTC de-
rivatives markets.  In that light, two provisions stand out.  First, section
2(h)(1) of the CEA now requires a swap to be submitted to a clearing-
52 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1673 (2010).  Section 722(d) (“Applicability”) of the
Dodd-Frank Act is now set forth as section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(i). Id.
53 See Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), (16), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49), (33) (2012).
54 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. R
55 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 725(g)(1)(A) (repealing the Commodities and Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 § 407, 7 U.S.C. § 27(e)).
56 Compare Dodd-Frank Act § 712(a)(1), (b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(1), (b)(1) (au-
thorizing the CFTC to regulate swaps and precluding CFTC jurisdiction over security-based
swaps, respectively), with § 712(a)(2), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(2), (b)(2) (authorizing
the SEC to regulate security-based swaps and precluding SEC jurisdiction over swaps, re-
spectively).  The SEC and CFTC jointly regulate a third hybrid category known as “mixed
swaps.” See § 712(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8).
57 See Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (adding § 4s to the CEA).
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house for clearing unless one of the parties was eligible for an exemp-
tion and elected not to clear the swap.58  Although this was intended
to minimize counterparty risk, its impact has been marginalized be-
cause other provisions exempt many participants and instruments in
the OTC derivatives market for a variety of reasons.59
Second, section 4s(e) of the CEA mandates margin requirements
(both initial and variation margin) for swap dealers and major swap
participants that trade in uncleared swaps.60  This provision generally
ensures (with notable exceptions) that current and potential risk ex-
posures between swap dealers and their counterparties are collateral-
ized, thereby reducing the danger that swap dealers or major swap
participants could take on excessive risk or be unable to fulfill their
obligations.  In addition, section 4s(l) of the CEA gives the counter-
party to the swap dealer or major swap participant the right to request
that such margin be segregated with a third-party custodian.  The
practical impact of these new margin rules was to require swap dealers
to collect initial and variation margin from many counterparties that
had not previously posted them, thus raising the cost of engaging in
the OTC derivatives market.
Collectively, these and other new provisions were certain to be
costly to swap dealers and others who could not escape them.61  The
U.S. financial services industry quickly recognized that its best hope
for relief was to convince financial regulators to adopt a broad theory
of substituted compliance62—namely, that a U.S. swap dealer would
comply with Dodd-Frank’s requirements if the transaction was based
abroad and complied with host-country requirements that were “sub-
stantially equivalent” to U.S. requirements.  If substituted compliance
was sufficient, then U.S. swap dealers could largely escape the danger
58 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1).
59 First, section 723 of the Dodd-Frank Act exempts commercial end-users from
mandatory clearing requirements.  Second, to the extent that the swap can be custom de-
signed, it will not be tradeable on an exchange, which can trade only relatively standard-
ized products.  This creates a strong incentive for swap dealers to avoid standardization.
60 7 U.S.C. § 4s(e).  The margin rules under the Dodd-Frank Act are complex and
vary by the nature of the counterparty.  For trades between swap entities, the rules require
the posting and collection of initial and variation margin.  Where the counterparty is not a
swap dealer or major swap participant, but is a financial institution, the swap dealer or
major swap participant must collect, but not pay, initial and variation margin.  Swap enti-
ties are not required, however, to collect or pay margin to nonfinancial entities (including
commercial end users).  For a brief review of these rules, see Examining the Extraterritorial
Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, supra note 14, at 277–80. R
61 The International Securities Dealers Association, a trade group, has estimated that
an additional $1 trillion in collateral may have to be posted as a result of proposed Dodd-
Frank reforms. See Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, supra note
14, at 280. R
62 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1302–07 (2013) (describing the efforts of the financial
industry to convince regulators to relax cross-border swaps rules).
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that Dodd-Frank would place them at a regulatory disadvantage to
their foreign competitors and possibly cost them business.
C. The CFTC’s Position
In June 2012, almost two years after the enactment of Dodd-
Frank, the CFTC finally addressed the key issue of extraterritorial ap-
plication by proposing “guidance” on when the provisions of Title VII
applicable to swap dealers and major swap participants would apply to
non-U.S. persons.63  Simply put, the CFTC’s proposed guidance fell
far short of what the U.S. financial services industry wanted, and their
predictable disappointment probably explains why the CFTC chose at
the outset to call its determinations “guidance,” rather than “rules.”64
Under its proposed “cross-border guidance,” non-U.S. persons with
significant swap positions were required to register with the CFTC as
swap entities65 (but would have been subject to only a limited set of
requirements based on this registration).  More substantive and de-
manding than these registration requirements were the proposed
“transaction-level” requirements; these would have applied to transac-
tions between (a) non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons, (b) foreign affil-
iates of a U.S. person and either U.S. or non-U.S. persons, and (c)
U.S. branches of a non-U.S. swap dealer and U.S. or non-U.S. per-
sons.66 These substantive requirements would have included clearing,
margin, real-time public reporting, trade execution, and sales prac-
tices.67  To illustrate, both the London branch of Morgan Stanley
transacting in London with a Hong Kong–based customer, and a Bar-
clays subsidiary entering into a transaction with a U.S. customer any-
where in the world, would have been covered.  In addition, if Barclays
operated in the United States, all its branches worldwide would have
been covered by the Dodd-Frank Act’s rules.  The regulatory burden
63 See Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (July 12, 2012) [hereinafter Cross-Border Application].
64 Although no CFTC document or commissioner has ever conceded this, the CFTC’s
insistence on calling this release “guidance” and a “policy statement,” rather than issuing it
as a formal rule, may have been an effort to avoid judicial review by the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, which has been increasingly ready to reject regulatory rules by financial regula-
tors that were not preceded by—in its view—an adequate cost/benefit analysis. See  Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We agree with the petitioners
and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once
again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule.”).  Nonetheless, this
exercise in prudential semantics has not spared the CFTC from litigation challenging these
rules on the same cost/benefit arguments in the D.C. Circuit.  In December 2013, such a
suit was brought by the major banking-industry trade groups. See Landon Thomas Jr., Wall
Street Challenges Overseas Swaps Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, at B5.  This issue of cost/
benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this Essay.
65 See Cross-Border Application, supra note 63, at 41,219. R
66 See id. at 41,228–29.
67 See id. at 41,225.
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clearly would have been substantial, and the guidance would have ex-
empted transactions only between a non-U.S. swap entity and a non-
U.S. counterparty that was not an affiliate of a U.S. person.
Effectively, this guidance sheltered from Dodd-Frank’s applica-
tion only non-U.S. registered swap dealers or non-U.S. major swap
participants, who could comply with comparable foreign regulatory
requirements as an alternative to complying with Dodd-Frank’s man-
dated transaction requirements when dealing with non-U.S. persons.
This exemption for non-U.S. swap dealers may have exacerbated the
problem for U.S. dealers, who now foresaw being placed at a competi-
tive disadvantage at their foreign branches and subsidiaries.
Even this proposed relief for non-U.S. swap dealers was not neces-
sarily available but would have required that the CFTC recognize that
the alternative host country’s requirements satisfied its tests for substi-
tuted compliance.  Here, the CFTC seemed intent on a substantive
review of the foreign regulations before deeming them comparable,68
and again this heightened the industry’s level of apprehension.
The CFTC’s proposed guidance touched off intensive negotia-
tions and lobbying.  In Congress, the sides were quickly drawn.
Republicans favored a broad definition of substituted compliance,
and legislation was introduced in the Republican-dominated House to
mandate that all G-20 nations automatically qualified for substituted
compliance.69  Because congressmen seldom feel pressure from for-
eigners (who cannot vote), this legislation seems clearly to have been
the product of lobbying by the financial services industry.  Conversely,
in the Democrat-dominated Senate, eight liberal Democratic senators
wrote to the CFTC and the SEC chairs to demand that loopholes be
closed in their swaps rules and that they not “outsource” their regula-
tions to foreign countries (i.e., that they should not recognize substi-
tuted compliance).70
More pressure, however, was applied from the opposite direction.
In April 2013, the EU and the finance ministers from most of the ma-
jor financial nations jointly sent a strongly worded letter to the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury and the CFTC, warning of a “fragmentation”
of the derivatives market if proper deference was not accorded to Eu-
68 See id. at 41,229–34 (setting forth the CFTC’s proposed substituted-compliance
regime).
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 113-103, at 2–3 (2013).
70 See Letter from Senators Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Carl Levin (D-MI), Tom Harkin (D-
IA), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Richard
Blumenthal (D-CT), and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), to the chairs of the SEC and CFTC
(July 3, 2013), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=
d452a900-e124-4c05-998f-80dbb58ea72a (urging both agencies to close perceived major
loopholes in their swaps rules and not defer to foreign regulators).
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ropean rules (and, in particular, EMIR).71  Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the SEC proposed its own corresponding rules for “security-
based swaps,” and the SEC—perhaps characteristically—took a more
restrained position, closer to that of the financial services industry,
thereby undercutting the CFTC by proposing a more expansive and
deferential definition of substituted compliance.72  Finally, a key Dem-
ocratic commissioner on the CFTC began to waiver in his support for
the CFTC’s harder-line position.73  With his support crumbling, CFTC
Chairman Gensler began to negotiate a compromise in order to hold
on to a majority.
In July 2013, in response to pressure from all sides, the CFTC
modified its proposed guidance.74  It retreated significantly, but not
completely.  First, to show that it was not abandoning its core position,
it expanded its definition of “U.S. person” to include both foreign
branches of a U.S. person and offshore hedge funds that had a major-
ity U.S. ownership (direct or indirect) or a principal place of business
in the United States.75  Then, in a significant retreat, it conceded that
foreign branches of U.S. banks could generally satisfy Dodd-Frank’s
requirements through substituted compliance (i.e., compliance with
the comparable requirements of another jurisdiction) if the transac-
tion had a “bona fide” connection to the non-U.S. branch.76  But if
the foreign branch of a U.S. bank entered into a swap with a U.S.
71 Nine senior financial regulators sent an April 18, 2013 letter to Treasury Secretary
Lew expressing concern about “fragmentation” in the OTC market if the United States
insisted on applying its own rules extraterritorially.  These included the relevant ministers
from Japan, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Switzerland, France, Germany, as well as Michel
Barnier, the EU’s Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services. See Interpretive Gui-
dance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed.
Reg. 45,292, 45,392 & n.455 (July 26, 2013) (discussing the negotiations) [hereinafter In-
terpretive Guidance].
72 See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 48, at 31,085 (“[T]he Commission R
is proposing a ‘comparability’ standard as the basis for making a substituted compliance
determination . . . [that would] ultimately focus on regulatory outcomes as a whole with
respect to the requirements within the same category rather than a rule-by-rule compari-
son.”). See also Andrew Ackerman, SEC Poised to Give Overseas Firms Leeway on Swaps, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2013, 5:53 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887
323798104578455263840421672.
73 The Democratic commissioner was Mark Wetjen, who was widely perceived as the
swing vote on the CFTC. See Shahien Nasiripour, Michael Mackenzie & Tom Braithwaite,
U.S. Watchdog Set to Weaken Derivatives Rules, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/e3fd4f66-81d0-11e2-b050-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2uGPlXRHw; see also
Jamila Trindle, CFTC Delays Swaps Vote as Member Voices Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2013,
8:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324880504578300772
419844396.
74 See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 71, at 45,292. R
75 See id. at 45,301–02.
76 See id. at 45,327–28 (viewing the foreign branch of a U.S. person as also a U.S.
person).  But having said that a foreign branch was a U.S. person, the Interpretive Gui-
dance then permitted these foreign branches in most cases to substitute compliance with
the rules of the location of the foreign branch. See id. at 45,342.
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person (other than another foreign branch of a U.S. bank), then U.S.
transactional rules would apply (and the foreign branch could not
rely on substituted compliance).77  The CFTC further indicated that,
in determining whether a particular category of requirements of an-
other country should be deemed comparable to Dodd-Frank’s re-
quirements, it would use an “outcomes-based approach.”78  But it did
not adopt the “holistic” approach that many had urged on it and
seemed prepared to closely examine the actual substantive rules of the
particular jurisdiction.
Correspondingly, non-U.S. swap dealers would be required to
comply with the CFTC’s transaction-level requirements in dealing with
U.S. persons and certain affiliates of U.S. persons.79  Thus, Goldman
Sachs’s London branch would have to observe Dodd-Frank’s transac-
tional requirements in dealing with U.S. persons but could compete
by the same rules as its European rivals in dealing with non-U.S. per-
sons and certain U.S. affiliates.  Similarly, a British bank would have to
comply with the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements in dealing with most
U.S. persons but not with non-U.S. persons (and certain affiliates of
U.S. persons).  Substituted compliance would not apply in these con-
texts where the counterparty was a U.S. person.  This position leveled
the playing field (so that U.S. swap dealers were at less of a competi-
tive disadvantage) but did not necessarily alleviate the problem of sys-
temic risk.
Equally importantly, the staff of the CFTC contemporaneously is-
sued a no-action letter in which it indicated that certain risk-manage-
ment requirements of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation
(EMIR) were substantially identical to the CFTC’s own rules.80  This
77 See id. at 45,348.
78 See id. at 45,342–43.
79 See id. at 45,350.
80 See No-Action Relief for Registered Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants from
Certain Requirements under Subpart I of Part 23 of Commission Regulations in Connec-
tion with Uncleared Swaps Subject to Risk Mitigation Techniques under EMIR, CFTC Let-
ter No. 13-45 (July 11, 2013) at 1 [hereinafter No-Action Letter].  The EMIR was adopted
on August 16, 2012 by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union.  It
authorized the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to develop technical
standards, which were in turn adopted by the EC on March 15, 2013.  One subpart of these
standards were the EMIR Risk Mitigation Rules, which basically apply to over-the-counter
(or “uncleared”) derivatives, including swaps.  The no-action letter found that the CFTC’s
Risk Mitigation Rules (Regulation §§ 23.501, 23.502, 23.503, and portions of 23.504, as
promulgated under section 4s(i) of the CEA) were “essentially identical” with the EMIR
Risk Mitigation Rules after a section-by-section comparison. Id. at 2.
Controversy surrounded the issuance of this advice in the form of a No-Action Letter
from a single CFTC division, rather than in the form of formal CFTC regulations.  In my
judgment, the use of an informal no-action letter may have been preferred because it likely
immunized this position from judicial review by the D.C. Circuit under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  Nonetheless,
litigation has been brought on this ground. See supra note 64. R
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seemed to imply that the European rules on the key “transaction-
level” issues relating to over-the-counter derivatives appeared to satisfy
the substituted-compliance standard.  That was critical because, as the
no-action letter noted, of the eighty swap dealers currently registered
with the CFTC, thirty-five were organized outside the United States, of
which twenty-two were established within the EU.81
In an understandable effort to gain needed time, the CFTC is-
sued an exemptive order on July 22, 2013, that effectively allowed it to
delay comparability determinations until late 2013.82  Then, on De-
cember 20, 2013, one day before the scheduled expiration of this ex-
emptive order, the CFTC announced a series of comparability
determinations covering the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, Hong
Kong, and Switzerland.83  Basically, the CFTC made favorable compa-
rability determinations for all six with respect to entity-level require-
ments, but largely reserved judgment on transaction-level
requirements, approving only a limited number of such requirements
for the EU and Japan.84  The CFTC also issued two no-action letters
81 See No-Action Letter, supra note 80, at n.1.
82 See Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78
Fed. Reg. 43,785, 43,792 (July 22, 2013).  The exemptive relief granted by this order ex-
pired no later than December 21, 2013. See id. at 43,794.
83 These comparability determinations for the six different countries (including the
EU) are set forth at 78 Fed. Reg. 78,864 (Australia), 78 Fed. Reg. 78,852 (Hong Kong), 78
Fed. Reg. 78,910 (Japan), 78 Fed. Reg. 78,899 (Switzerland), 78 Fed. Reg. 78,839 (Ca-
nada), and 78 Fed. Reg. 78,923 (European Union).  All were published in the Federal
Register on December 27, 2013.  In addition, “transaction-level” determinations were made
for the European Union and Japan.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 78,878 (European Union) (Dec. 27,
2013) and 78 Fed. Reg. 78,890 (Japan) (Dec. 27, 2013).  These determinations are suc-
cinctly summarized in a Davis Polk client memorandum. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP,
CFTC ISSUES CROSS-BORDER SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE DETERMINATIONS, PROVIDES LIMITED
PHASE IN FOR SOME SWAP REQUIREMENTS (2014), available at http://www.davispolk.com/
sites/default/files/01.07.14.CFTC_.Issues.CrossBorder.Substituted.pdf [hereinafter DAVIS
POLK CLIENT MEMO].
84 The CFTC made its comparability determinations for each of the six above-listed
countries with respect to the following “entity-level” requirements: (1) position limit moni-
toring; (2) diligent supervision; (3) business continuity and disaster recovery; (4) research
and clearing conflicts; and (5) availability of information for disclosure and swap data re-
cordkeeping (subject to some exceptions).  The CFTC did not, however, make comparabil-
ity determinations for any jurisdiction with respect to its requirement that swap dealers
provide it with compliance and risk reports. See DAVIS POLK CLIENT MEMO, supra note 83, at R
2.  Thus, while swap dealers can rely on substituted compliance for most entity-level re-
quirements in these six jurisdictions, they will still need to submit some reports and
records to the CFTC.
With respect to “transaction-level” requirements, the CFTC found the EU’s trade con-
firmation, portfolio reconciliation, and portfolio compression requirements fully compara-
ble to those in the United States. See 78 Fed. Reg. 78,886 (trade confirmation), 78,884
(portfolio reconciliation), 78,885 (portfolio compression).  Only pretrade execution infor-
mation in the EU was found less than comparable. See 78 Fed. Reg. 78,888.  In the case of
Japan, the CFTC found Japanese daily trading records comparable, but made no finding
with respect to trade confirmation, portfolio reconciliation, and portfolio compression
standards.  78 Fed. Reg. 78,897.
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delaying the application of swap data–reporting rules for certain non-
U.S. swap dealers.85  Nonetheless, despite these steps, the Wall Street
Journal reported that the CFTC’s actions were “likely to renew criti-
cism the U.S. is bidding to become the de facto global financial regu-
lator” because the CFTC “only narrowly recognized overseas
regulations, permitting overseas firms to fall under their home-coun-
try rules” by limiting its approval of transaction-level requirements.86
By the end of 2013, the CFTC was only midway through its pro-
cess.  It had indicated that, except in certain transactions with U.S.
persons, non-U.S. swap dealers would generally be able to rely on sub-
stituted compliance, but it had not yet decided whether most transac-
tion-level requirements (and some entity-level requirements) were
adequately equivalent to satisfy its substituted-compliance standards at
even the most financially developed and comparable nations.87
Then, everything changed with the departure in early 2014 of the
CFTC’s chairman, Gary Gensler, whose activist style was uncharacteris-
tic for the CFTC.88  Gensler’s successor, acting chairman Mark P.
Wetjen, moved quickly to modify Gensler’s position and accept substi-
tuted compliance on a more thorough-going and deferential basis.89
According to the Wall Street Journal, the timing of the CFTC’s relaxa-
tion of its OTC derivatives rules in February 2014 was motivated by the
February 15, 2014, deadline on which U.S. trading restrictions were to
go into effect, even though Europe had “yet to set a date for the im-
plementation of its swaps-trading rules, which . . . some fear aren’t as
More significantly, the CFTC did not make comparability determinations for any juris-
diction for transaction-level requirements with respect to clearing and trade execution.
85 See CFTC Letter No. 13-75 (Dec. 20, 2013) (entitled “Time-Limited No-Action Re-
lief from Certain Requirements of Part 45 and Part 46 of the Commission’s Regulations,
for Certain Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants Established under the Laws of Aus-
tralia, Canada, the European Union, Japan or Switzerland”); CFTC Letter No. 13-78 (Dec.
20, 2013) (entitled “Time-Limited No-Action Relief from Certain Entity-Level Internal Bus-
iness Conduct Requirements for Certain Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants Estab-
lished under the Laws of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and
Switzerland”).
86 See Andrew Ackerman, CFTC Extends Some Swaps Rules to Overseas Firms, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 21, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304866
904579272510388548966.
87 See discussion supra.
88 See Ben Protess, Regulator of Wall Street Loses Its Hard-Charging Chairman, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2014, 8:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/regulator-of-wall-
street-loses-its-hard-charging-chairman/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
89 See Andrew Ackerman & Katy Burne, CFTC is Set to Ease Rules on Trading Swaps
Overseas, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2014, 9:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10
001424052702303874504579375383950134254; see also Phillip Stafford & Gina Chon, Regu-
lators Reach Deal on Over-the-Counter Derivatives Rules, FIN. TIMES, (Feb. 12, 2014), available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1ab8840c-940a-11e3-a0e1-00144feab7de.html#
axzz2vXSesM8K.  For Mr. Wetjen’s position, see Testimony of Mark P. Wetjen, Acting
Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Commission, before the Senate Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Committee (Feb. 6, 2014).
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strict as U.S. restrictions.”90  Thus, by allowing swap dealers to escape
the new U.S. rules, this relaxation implied that swap dealers would
remain largely unregulated in Europe for an interim period.  Given
these differences in timing and strictness, observers, according to the
Wall Street Journal, concluded that the impact of the CFTC’s decision
“will encourage banks to move more swaps trading overseas to escape
strict U.S. regulations intended to bring more transparency to the
opaque financial products.”91
This conclusion seems inescapable: for the United States, substi-
tuted compliance will mean a loss of market share, revenues, and jobs
as trading moves overseas to marginally less-regulated markets.  To be
sure, the magnitude of this loss cannot now be estimated, but it is a
rare policy shift that both (1) exposes the United States to greater risk
and (2) costs it jobs and market share at the same time.  The logic of
such a policy shift needs closer scrutiny.
In any event, the CFTC’s rules remain in limbo, with no final
rules but only interpretive “guidance” having been adopted.  Even
though this guidance may shift from time to time, the CFTC’s position
still appears more aggressive than that of its sibling regulator, the
SEC, in three respects.  First, the CFTC’s definition of “U.S. person”
captures offshore hedge funds that are majority owned by U.S. per-
sons or that have their principal place of business in the U.S.92  Sec-
ond, the CFTC may continue to insist that swap dealers, foreign or
domestic, transacting with U.S. persons (other than a foreign branch
of a U.S. bank) must comply with the CFTC’s rules and not those of
any other country.93  Substituted compliance thus operates only
within a lesser range for the CFTC.  Third and most important, while
the SEC’s rules require an explicit and legally enforceable guarantee
before the foreign affiliate’s swap activity is attributed to the parent
U.S. institution, the CFTC’s “guidance” recognizes implicit guarantees
also.94
D. The SEC’s Position
Uncertain as the final shape of the CFTC’s margin rules may be,
the CFTC’s overall approach to the topic of substituted compliance
90 See Ackerman & Burne, supra note 89. R
91 Id.
92 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  Essentially, the CFTC “looks through” R
the ownership of a collective investment vehicle to determine the “U.S. person” status of its
owners, but the SEC does not.
93 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. R
94 For a detailed comparison of the SEC’s and the CFTC’s positions on this point, see
Dan Ryan, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, SEC’s Cross–Border Derivatives Rule, (July 19, 2014,
9:00 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/07/19/secs-cross-border-deriva-
tives-rule/.
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clearly seems more exacting than the SEC’s.  In its proposed rules for
cross-border swaps trading, the SEC made no effort to carve out trans-
actions with U.S. persons as beyond the reach of substituted compli-
ance.95  Still, the SEC did sensibly subdivide its comparability analysis
into four separate categories, indicating that it would make “substi-
tuted compliance determinations with respect to four separate catego-
ries of requirements,” with the result that if a foreign jurisdiction
achieved “comparable regulatory outcomes in three out of the four
categories, then the Commission would permit substituted compli-
ance with respect to those three categories of comparable require-
ments,” but not for the fourth.96  This means that the SEC’s approach
is less holistic than it first appears, as close (or even identical) compa-
rability in one of these four categories would not spill over and bias
the comparison in another category.
Still, the SEC has recognized that some issues interrelate.  Thus, it
has indicated that it “would expect to make a substituted compliance
determination for the entire group of related requirements.”97  It
added:
For example, the core entity-level requirements relate to the regula-
tion of an entity’s capital and margin.  But certain other entity-level
requirements (such as risk management, general recordkeeping
and reporting, and diligent supervision) are so interconnected with
capital and margin oversight that we would expect to make substi-
tuted compliance determinations, where warranted with regard to
capital and margin rules, on the entire package of entity-level
regulations.98
Thus, those rules having the greatest significance from a systemic-risk
standpoint (most notably, capital adequacy and margin) would typi-
cally be reviewed on an interrelated basis.  This probably makes sense,
but the SEC also believes that entity-level decisions as to capital ade-
quacy and margin should not be made by it, in the case of a swap
entity that is a bank, but by the appropriate banking regulator.99  Be-
cause banks are the largest swap dealers, this leaves the SEC formally
determining substituted compliance but deferring to the bank regula-
tors to make the determination as to the most important provisions
(from a systemic-risk perspective) in that calculus.
95 See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 48, at 30,975. R
96 Id.  The four categories are: (1) requirements applicable to registered security-
based swap dealers under section 15F of the Exchange Act; (2) requirements relating to
regulatory reporting and public dissemination of information on security-based swaps; (3)
requirements relating to clearing for security-based swaps; and (4) requirements relating
to trade execution for security-based swaps. See id. at 31,085.
97 Id. at 31,088.
98 Id. at 31,088–89.
99 Id. at 31,090.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN601.txt unknown Seq: 27 22-SEP-14 8:24
2014] EXTRATERRITORIAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 1285
Unlike the CFTC, the SEC did adopt final rules in 2014, but in so
doing it built an extraordinary loophole into its rules.  Over the pro-
tests of two Democratic commissioners (Kara Stein and Luis Aguilar),
the SEC’s rules define a “U.S. person” to include a foreign subsidiary
where its obligations to counterparties are legally guaranteed by the
U.S. parent, but not a foreign subsidiary whose obligations are only
implicitly guaranteed.100  As commissioner Stein and others have
noted, the result is to create a perverse incentive: U.S. banks can avoid
U.S. rules by using a foreign subsidiary and only “implicitly” guaran-
teeing its debt.101  Already, a trend in this direction has been de-
tected.102  The SEC’s rules thus encourage banks to park risky
activities in an offshore subsidiary (just as AIG did to start the 2008
crisis) with the only distinction being that the liability not be formally
guaranteed.  The bottom line is that we have come full circle back to
where we were in 2007, with the regulatory seeds for the next crisis
having been already sown.
E. The European Reaction and a Proposal
As of early 2014, the SEC and CFTC disagreed mainly over how
much protection should be given to U.S. persons.  The CFTC re-
quired all swap dealers generally to play by its rules when the transac-
tion involves a U.S. person (but not otherwise),103 while the SEC
permitted all offshore transactions to be governed by the still emerg-
ing rules of substituted compliance (without any special exception for
transactions with U.S. persons).104  Both agencies were ready to defer
in most cases to foreign regulators if they judged their rules (at differ-
ing levels of granularity) to be functionally equivalent.105  Yet, at pre-
100 See Exchange Act Release No. 34-72472 (“Application of ‘Security-Based Swap
Dealer’ and ‘Major Security-Based Swap Participant’ Definitions to Cross-Border Security-
Based Swap Activities”), 79 Fed. Reg. 39,068 (July 9, 2014).
101 See Andrew Ackerman, SEC Signs Off on Foreign-Bank Swap Rules, WALL ST. J., June
25, 2014 (discussing views on both commissioners.  For the critical views of Commissioner
Kara Stein, see “Open Meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Subject:
Consideration of Rules Regarding the Application of ‘Security-Based Swap Dealer’ and
‘Major Security-Based Swap Participant,’” June 25, 2014 (Federal News Service), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2014/062514openmeeting.shtml.  Commis-
sioner Stein observed that the adopted rule “ignores the reality of corporate finance by
assuming that the United States parent is linked to the foreign affiliate only when an ex-
plicit recourse guarantee is provided to a third party.” Id. at 9.  She then noted: “Not
surprisingly, recent reports suggest that firms are restructuring their form of agreements to
restrict or remove explicit contractual guarantees. But it appears that little of the substance
has actually changed.” Id. at 10.
102 For a confirmation of Commissioner Stein’s views that the industry is moving to
exploit this loophole, see Peter Eakins, Wall Street’s Quiet Turnabout on Swaps, N.Y. TIMES
(Dealbook) (May 2, 2014).
103 See Cross-Border Application, supra note 63, at 41,217–18. R
104 See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 48, at 30,975. R
105 See id. at 31,009; see also Cross-Border Application, supra note 63, at 41,217. R
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sent, no one quite knows what the applicable European rules are (for
example, with regard to margin).
Europe remains undecided on many of these questions.106  Start-
ing, as the United States did, from the same G-20 agreement on OTC
derivatives at the 2009 summit, Europe has moved more slowly, and
symptomatic fissures have appeared within its regulatory structure.  A
“trialogue” on this issue in December 2013 among the European Par-
liament, the European Commission, and the Council of the European
Union ended in an “acrimonious” stalemate, with the British and
French delegates criticizing each other.107  Such division is not sur-
prising and reflects the fact that the United States has a much
stronger federal structure than Europe.  Intense as the debate over
financial regulation may be in the United States, the individual states
do not intervene in it (i.e., California does not object to the SEC or
sue the CFTC).  But in Europe, individual nations can and do object
and delay agreement.  Predictably, the delay would be even greater if
global harmonization were sought, and industry groups are adept at
exploiting this tendency toward fragmentation to delay reforms that
are costly to them.108
Earlier, this Essay suggested the need for a minilateral strategy in
dealing with systemic risk in order to address the underlying public-
goods problem. The European difficulty with OTC rules illustrates
this need.  Put simply, some nations will resist or delay reform because
(i) the reforms have adverse distributional consequences to them or
(ii) they do not expect to bear the full costs of a systemic-risk crisis.
Thus, if Europe has difficulty in acting, a global resolution seems even
more infeasible in the near term (both because many nations would
resist what they would see as excessive U.S. pressure and because the
resulting principles would likely be too vague and general to have
much impact).  As a generalization, the more the parties to the nego-
tiation, the greater the possibility that some group can exercise a mi-
nority veto, slowing or blocking the reform as a practical matter.
While soft-law proponents believe in harmonization of standards, they
ignore the greater vulnerability of harmonization, as a process played
out on a larger stage, to deliberate obstruction by highly motivated
industry groups.109
106 See Danny Hakim, Europeans Struggle to Set Derivatives Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014,
at B-1.
107 Id. at B-2.
108 Often the resentment at U.S. “imperialism” seems to be stoked by lobbying firms
representing the industry (and sometimes based in the United States).  In the case of the
current EU deadlock, the Commodity Markets Council (which is based in Washington)
appears to be leading the opposition to the E.U.’s proposed rule. Id. at B-2.
109 See id.
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Given this difficulty, how then should financial regulators escape
this dilemma?  Current proposals seem likely only to exacerbate the
problem.  In its proposed cross-border swaps rules, the SEC contem-
plates that swap dealers, or groups of them, would apply to it for a
“substituted compliance determination” that, for example, the regula-
tory regime of “Country X” was functionally equivalent to that of the
United States.110  This procedure will likely result in all the major se-
curity-based swap dealers active in Country X filing a joint submission
with the SEC.  Arguably, this will confront the SEC with a powerful
lobby, and also provide it with little opportunity to discuss and negoti-
ate with Country X.
Instead, the better route would be for Country X to itself file the
application with the SEC in order that there could be joint discussion
as to what changes the U.S. regulator wanted before it would deem
Country X’s regulatory regime functionally equivalent.  The result
would be a quiet bilateral negotiation.  Already, under the SEC’s pro-
posed rules, some bilateral negotiations between U.S. regulators and
those in the host country are necessary, as the SEC requires that a
memorandum of understanding between the United States and the
host country governing supervision and enforcement have been
signed.111  The key advantages of this approach are that (i) it does not
treat the host country’s laws as static and fixed and (ii) it does not
place the United States in the unattractive position of seemingly tell-
ing the world what its laws must say.  Instead, a quieter negotiation
would begin over the narrower issue of functional equivalence.
To be sure, bilateral negotiations face problems of diplomacy.
Once the United States has found some nations to be functionally
equivalent (as it now has at least for entity-level requirements), it is
stigmatizing and potentially humiliating for it to tell other nations that
their legal regimes are not equivalent.  The implication is that its laws
and practices are somehow backward.
What, then, is the better strategy?  Ideally, the United States (pos-
sibly in conjunction with the EU) should proactively define what the
critical elements are of a functionally equivalent policy toward OTC
derivatives.  These criteria should focus more on those factors that
truly relate to systemic risk (e.g., capital, leverage, margin, etc.) and
less on rules that relate to consumer protection or business conduct.
Announcement of those rules should precede negotiation.  Nations
eager to achieve functional equivalence could then score themselves
in advance and take steps to comply.  Motivating them would be an
implicit threat: failure to reach an agreement with the United States
would mean that U.S. swap entities (i.e., dealers and major swap par-
110 SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 48, at 31,094. R
111 See id. at 31,088–89.
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ticipants) would be unable to trade with other swap dealers in their
jurisdiction—at least without fully complying with Dodd-Frank’s re-
quirements.  In effect, the trading parties would have to comply with
both U.S. and foreign law, and this might well be impossible.  Thus,
this approach taxes the free riders who are unwilling to reach a modus
vivendi with the United States.
Moreover, now that the United States and the EU have reached
partial agreement on their rules for swaps trading (even if many
blanks remain to be filled in), an opportunity for rapid legal develop-
ment looms.  Together, U.S. and EU entities account for a high major-
ity of global swaps trading112 and possess considerable leverage in
encouraging other nations to play by their rules.  If they could jointly
agree on common criteria, they would thereby notify other countries
(e.g., Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Brazil) as to the mini-
mum requirements that they would require to consider another regu-
latory regime functionally equivalent.  That is, rather than sitting
down to multiple negotiations, each with its unique facts, or conven-
ing a global conference aimed at international harmonization, the
United States and Europe could proactively declare in advance what
the minimum elements were that they would require before another
regulatory regime could qualify for substituted compliance.  That
would have impact because many nations are still slowly grappling
with how to design their rules and are well behind the United States
in the pace of their reforms.113  At such a formative moment, such
guidance would effectively define the path forward.
II
THE VOLCKER RULE AND STRUCTURAL REFORM
The so-called Volcker Rule is a prophylactic provision of the
Dodd-Frank Act that broadly prohibits “banking entities” from “engag-
ing in proprietary trading” or “acquiring or retaining any equity, part-
nership, or other ownership interest in or sponsoring a hedge fund or
private equity fund,” subject to a number of exceptions.114  The statu-
tory language of the Dodd-Frank Act applies to both (i) U.S. bank
holding companies and their affiliates and (ii) non-U.S. bank holding
companies licensed to do business in the United States,115 but it ex-
112 See Ferrarini & Saguato, supra note 9, at 328. R
113 See CFTC & SEC, Joint Report on International Swap Regulation 100 & n.429
(2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/df-
study_isr_013112.pdf.
114 See Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (2010).  This provision adds a new section 13 to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.  The provision will be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1851.  The quoted language in the text is in section 13(a)(l)(A) and (B).
115 Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act uses the term “banking entity,” which is defined
in section 13(h)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act to include any company that is
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empts trading that “occurs solely outside of the United States” when
the banking entity is not controlled “directly or indirectly” by a U.S.
banking entity.116  Thus, a foreign bank with even a single branch in
the United States is subject to the Volcker Rule unless it can establish
that a particular trading decision occurred “solely outside of the
United States.”  To this extent, the Volcker Rule effectively does apply
extraterritorially because at a minimum it requires banks with U.S.
branches to undertake significant compliance obligations to assure
that their trading stays well outside the United States.
In principle, U.S. financial regulators could have potentially pur-
sued a substituted-compliance approach with respect to the Volcker
Rule, but they did not—probably for a variety of reasons.  Instead,
when financial regulators jointly issued their final version of the
Volcker Rule in December 2013, they elaborately expanded on this
“solely outside of the United States” test.117  Under the final rule, a
foreign banking entity must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) The banking entity (including any personnel that arrange, nego-
tiate or execute the purchase or sale) may not be located in the
United States;
(ii) The banking entity (including any relevant personnel) that
makes the decision to purchase or sell may not be located in the
United States or organized under the laws of the United States or
of any state;
(iii) The purchase or sale is not accounted for, directly or on a con-
solidated basis, by any branch or affiliate that is located in the
treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking
Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. § 3106) and any affiliate or subsidiary thereof.  Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 § 13(h)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.
116 Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 13(d) (“Permitted Activities”) to
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and section 13(d)(1)(H) thereof permits
“[p]roprietary trading conducted by a banking entity . . . provided that the trading occurs
solely outside of the United States and that the banking entity is not directly or indirectly
controlled by a banking entity that is organized under the laws of the United States or of
one or more states.”  Dodd-Frank Act § 619, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1625 (2010).
Under the final rule, a transaction originated in the United States but executed in Europe
by a foreign bank would not thus qualify under the “solely” test. See SEC Release No.
BHCA-1, supra note 36, at 421–24. R
117 The initial version of the Volcker Rule was jointly proposed on October 11, 2011 by
the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Passes Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Prohibi-
tions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships
with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (Oct. 11, 2011), available at www.fdic.gov/
news/news/press/2011/pr11160.html; Proposed Rule (“Prohibitions and Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and
Private Equity Funds”), 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 44, at 3
(2014)).  The final rule was adopted on December 10, 2013. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1,
supra note 36. R
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United States or organized under the laws of the United States or
of any state;
(iv) No financing for the transaction is provided by any branch or
affiliate located in the United States or organized under the laws
of the United States or of any state; and
(v) The purchase or sale is not conducted through any U.S. entity
(with certain limited exceptions).118
Unlike the CFTC’s and SEC’s OTC regulations, the Volcker Rule’s
legal foundation rests on a combination of inherent sovereignty and
territorialism.  In its view, the United States regulates its own banks,
even when they act abroad (i.e., an assertion of national sovereignty),
but it oversees foreign banks only when they are acting on U.S. soil
(i.e., a territorial approach).  If an institution is not a U.S. bank and
all the attributes of its trading transaction occur abroad, it is beyond
the scope of the Volcker Rule, and functional equivalence between
U.S. law and foreign law becomes irrelevant.  This restricted approach
was not inevitable; indeed, one can imagine cases where this territorial
approach may be seriously underinclusive.  For example, a bank
chartered in Europe could have 45 percent of its operations in the
United States (and extensive commitments to U.S. counterparties)
and could permissibly engage in significant proprietary trading in Eu-
rope, which would be exempt from the Volcker Rule, but this trading
could cause it to fail.  Its failure could then destabilize its U.S.
counterparties, but this risk has been accepted by the Volcker Rule.
Viewed from a distance, the puzzle here is why banking regula-
tors followed an entirely different approach toward defining the extra-
territorial application of U.S. law than did securities and derivatives
regulators.  An initial reason was probably caution.  The Volcker Rule
was greeted with both hostility and skepticism in Europe.  As the chief
executive of the Institute of International Bankers objected, the origi-
nal proposed version of the Volcker Rule would “reach far beyond the
shores of the U.S. and apply . . . to all of the global activities of every
foreign bank that maintains even so much as a small branch in the
U.S.”119  Similarly, Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for
Internal Market and Services, has insisted that it is not “acceptable
that U.S. rules have such a wide effect on other nations.”120  Broad
118 For exact language, see SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 36, at 421–23. R
119 See Sally Miller, Letter to the Editor, Why Non-U.S. Regulators Are Not Happy with the
“Volcker Rule,” FIN. TIMES, February 21, 2012, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
50d2c224-58b5-11e1-b9c6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2uGPlXRHw.  Ms. Miller is the chief ex-
ecutive officer of the Institute of International Bankers.
120 See Yalman Onaran, Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage, BLOOM-
BERG, Feb. 23, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/banks-
lobbied-to-widen-volcker-rule-before-inciting-foreigners-against-law.html.
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extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule might then have ig-
nited a political firestorm.
Second, history counts.  Substituted compliance is a new concept
for banking regulators—one into which they have never bought.  Tra-
ditionally, banking regulators view banking as an activity that can only
be conducted within the terms of a license given by the state.  In con-
trast, for securities regulators, trading (including in OTC derivatives)
is something that anyone can do and does not require a special li-
cense.121  Also, banking regulators understandably view bank failure
as a serious event, one outweighing the insolvency of a broker-dealer
because of likely greater externalities, and so they have taken a
broader view of their entitlement to regulate their banks’ activities on
a global basis.
Third, it is questionable whether any functional equivalent exists
to the Volcker Rule in Europe (without which it is pointless to discuss
substituted compliance).  The Volcker Rule is a uniquely American
innovation that was not part of the package of reforms agreed upon
by the G-20 nations (whereas clearinghouses, exchanges, and margin
for OTC derivatives were central parts of that jointly agreed
package).122
This third conclusion can be debated.  As legal realists might ex-
pect, functional equivalence may lie in the eye of the beholder.  Eu-
rope has in fact developed a functionally similar (but far from
equivalent) structural protection that parallels the Volcker Rule:
known as “ring-fencing,” this safeguard limits who within banks may
engage in proprietary trading.123  In February 2012, EU commissioner
Michel Barnier appointed a High-Level Expert Group on structural
bank reform.124  Chaired by Erkki Liikanen, it held hearings, con-
sulted broadly, and issued its final report in October 2012 (which, of
course, became known as the “Liikanen Report”).  That report con-
cluded “that it is necessary to require legal separation of certain par-
ticularly risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within a
121 Of course, brokers must be licensed, but a broker is defined as “any person en-
gaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.”
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c.  Active engagement in trad-
ing requires no license; only acting as an agent for others in executing transactions re-
quires one to be a licensed broker.
122 See Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, supra note 14, at R
272–74 (explaining the G-20’s usual approach to extraterritorial financial regulation).
123 See id. at 301–03 (discussing how European regulators were considering measures
that do not allow retail banking deposits to be used for certain investments).
124 See FINAL REPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF
THE E.U. BANKING SECTOR, at i (Oct. 2, 2012) (Letter from the chairman setting forth the
history of the report) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP].
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banking group.”125  According to its chairman, the objective of such
reform was:
to make banking groups, especially their socially most vital parts
(mainly deposit-taking and providing financial services to the non-
financial sectors in the economy), safer and less connected to high-
risk trading activities and to limit the implicit or explicit stake of
taxpayer [sic] in the trading parts of banking groups.126
Specifically, the Liikanen Report recommended that “proprietary
trading and other significant trading activities should be assigned to a
separate legal entity if the activities to be separated amount to a signif-
icant share of a bank’s business.”127  Thus, in theory, failure of the
trading subsidiary would not imperil the deposit-taking bank.  This is
both broader and narrower in scope than the Volcker Rule because it
applies to all trading (i.e., non-proprietary trading as well) and other
risky activities,128 but it still permits the banking group to engage in
some trading and contains a de minimis exclusion if the level of risky
trading is low.
This idea of “ring-fencing” the deposit-taking financial institution
has been taken the farthest in the UK.  There, the UK’s Independent
Commission on Banking (ICB) recommended in 2011 that large UK
banks should ring-fence their retail bank operations into separate le-
gal subsidiaries with their own prudential safeguards.129  The ring-
fenced retail subsidiary would take deposits and engage in normal re-
tail banking activities, but it would be generally prohibited from en-
gaging in most other forms of risk-taking activity.  Although the
Liikanen Report has not yet produced any legislation seeking to codify
it, the UK’s ICB report has been strongly supported in the UK, with
the UK government committing to have all necessary legislation in
place by 2015.130
Real differences separate these ring-fencing proposals from the
Volcker Rule.  Both the ICB and Liikanen proposals seem primarily
concerned with protecting customer deposits and thereby averting the
need for a taxpayer-financed bailout.131  Thus, they are prepared (to
varying degrees) to allow the overall banking group to take on high-
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at iii.
128 Id. at iv–vi. (describing other “risky financial activities” that would have to be segre-
gated in a ring-fenced subsidiary, including derivatives and “certain other activities closely
linked with securities and derivatives markets”).
129 Id. at 85–86 (describing the history of the ICB proposal and the UK reaction to it).
130 Id. at 86.  Although the legislation would be fully in place by 2015, full compliance
would not be required until 2019.
131 See id. at 88 (discussing the European regulatory approach, which seeks to protect
“small-and-medium sized enterprises” and individual citizens by ensuring that banks are
“capable of financing the real economy”).
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risk activities, provided that customer deposits are protected.  In con-
trast, the Volcker Rule seems intended to protect the “too big to fail”
financial institution from insolvency, possibly on the ground that its
failure might initiate a chain of falling dominoes among highly inter-
connected institutions that could topple the financial system as a
whole.  Also, proponents of the Volcker Rule may suspect that the de-
posit-taking bank might find ways to support its securities trading affil-
iate (to its own detriment), even if it could not guarantee the latter’s
obligations.  Thus, although these ring-fencing proposals have similar
aims to the Volcker Rule, they are less prophylactic and far from
equivalent in their purposes or prohibitions.
Nonetheless, despite all these differences, it is not inconceivable
that banking regulators could at some point accept the idea of substi-
tuted compliance.  For a variety of reasons, this seems at least plausi-
ble.132  If they did accept the concept, and deemed “ring-fencing” to
be functionally equivalent to the Volcker Rule, this would permit cov-
ered U.S. financial institutions to shift their proprietary trading to
London and place their proprietary trading in separate subsidiaries
that would be ring-fenced from their deposit-taking arms.  The conse-
quences would then be dramatically different.  For example, for insti-
tutions such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley that do not operate
as standard commercial banks or generally take deposits,133 little, if
any, changes from their prior practices and business models would be
required of them under either the ICB or Liikanen proposals.  Under
such a legal regime, compliance with the UK’s rules would mean that
a Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs would be in compliance with the
U.S. law under the doctrine of substituted compliance, at least if all
their proprietary trading was moved to the UK.  To be sure, under the
Liikanen Report’s proposed standards, Morgan Stanley or Goldman
Sachs might have to place their proprietary-trading operations into a
separate subsidiary that would be ring-fenced from its other opera-
tions.  This would be more costly, but it would be feasible.  All in all,
this example shows how broadly the concept of substituted compli-
132 The Federal Reserve is particularly internationally minded and has long negotiated
soft-law standards with respect to topics such as capital adequacy at banks. See, e.g., Basel
Regulatory Framework, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/basel/default.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). They also may not want to be
caught in the position of having to enforce a “rigid” Volcker Rule that tolerated no excep-
tions.  Hence, they may be open to the idea of substituted compliance, even if they might
demand more than the SEC before they find functional equivalence.
133 Goldman Sachs does have a small commercial bank that is licensed to operate in
the UK. See Ambereen Choudhury, Goldman Sachs Gets U.K. Approval to Operate Bank Unit,
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 17, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-17/
goldman-sachs-gets-u-k-approval-to-operate-bank-unit.html.  However, Goldman might be
willing to either dispose of this unit or “ring-fence” it if doing so permitted it to engage in
proprietary trading in the UK.
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ance could reach and how subversive it could be to be the goal of
prudential bank supervision (that is, if it were read to allow U.S. banks
to escape the Volcker Rule).134
To sum up, although it is possible to make plausible arguments
that all three approaches (the U.S.’s Volcker Rule, the UK’s ICB pro-
posal, and the Liikanen Report) have similar aims, they are not func-
tionally equivalent because the Volcker Rule alone bars the parent
entity from taking on specified risks (while the other two proposals
demand only that depositors be protected).135  Nonetheless, one can
imagine the banking industry arguing that these different legal re-
gimes should be deemed functionally equivalent.  That frames the
next and last question: how strict do systemic risk rules have to be to
work?  Can valid distinctions be drawn between securities and banking
regulations in terms of the extraterritorial application of these rules?
III
IS THERE EXCESSIVE EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DODD-FRANK?
Does U.S. law need to sweep as broadly as it seems to do under
Dodd-Frank?  To this point, this Essay has argued that U.S. financial
regulators need to have jurisdiction over the offshore activities of the
subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. financial institutions.  Banking au-
thorities clearly have such authority, but securities and derivatives reg-
ulators are under great pressure to defer to the host-country regulator
under a substituted-compliance rationale.  But U.S. law sweeps even
more broadly than that, as the Dodd-Frank Act sometimes applies to
foreign firms with U.S. branches and to the counterparties of U.S. fi-
nancial institutions as well.136  Is this necessary?
Although the 2008 crisis certainly underlined the dangers of off-
shore activities, the most vivid illustration of these dangers—AIG’s fail-
ure137—should not be overread.  Anxiety-raising as the AIG example
is, it can be used to prove too much.  On closer inspection, it shows
134 In fairness, a distinction can be drawn here between various types of “ring-fencing.”
If all that is done is to segregate the deposit-taking arm of the financial institution (but the
rest of a systemically significant financial institution is exposed to the risks of proprietary
trading), then the Volcker Rule and “ring-fencing” are not by any means functionally
equivalent.  Alone, the Volcker Rule seeks to protect the solvency of the systemically signifi-
cant institution (and not just its deposit-taking arm).  But if “ring-fencing” were to require
that the unit that engages in proprietary trading be isolated from the rest of the financial
institution (with no direct or even implicit guarantees from parents or affiliates), then the
case can be made that the two regimes achieve much the same result—and are, loosely
speaking, equivalent.  Negotiations between the United States and the UK could focus on
how large this segregated unit that engaged in proprietary trading could be.
135 See FINAL REPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP, supra note 124, at 87–88. R
136 See Greenberger, supra note 4, at 968–69 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s regulation of R
counterparties for swap transactions).
137 See Sjostrom, supra note 7, at 986–89 (discussing AIG’s ability to pursue offshore R
transactions due to a lack of regulation).
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only that an unregulated counterparty dealing in swaps can cause a
financial meltdown.  It does not show that the mere presence of a
foreign bank in the United States through a branch office justifies
conferring on U.S. regulators worldwide supervisory jurisdiction over
the foreign bank.
More generally, a basic distinction surfaces here: the prospect of
a potential “tragedy of the commons” is far less likely in this context of
the Volcker Rule than in the context of OTC derivatives trading.
Why?  In economic terms, a defining characteristic of a “tragedy of the
commons” is that an actor can escape having to internalize costs that
it imposes on others.  Thus, a nation that offers unregulated trading
in derivatives satisfies this condition to the extent that it will not bear
the costs of financial contagion but can profit by offering a dangerous
“financial casino” to the world.  In contrast, no nation can escape the
costs of its own banks failing.  If a nation permits its leading financial
institutions to engage in a risky activity (such as, for example, proprie-
tary trading), it must internalize the costs of the eventual failure of
those institutions.  This is very different from a jurisdiction simply per-
mitting foreign third parties to trade within its territory (which may
result in increased revenue as a result of regulatory arbitrage but no
costs to that jurisdiction, even in the event of a financial failure).  To
illustrate, the Cayman Islands could, for example, permit foreign
banks to trade swaps at low cost on its soil without posting margin or
segregating collateral, but even it must regulate its own banks (or suf-
fer the consequences).  Hence, we should not expect that, absent ex-
traterritorial regulation by the U.S., foreign banks will go unregulated.
Indeed, Europe’s decision to ring-fence its banks shows this.  From
this perspective, the United States may be justified in prohibiting the
affiliates and subsidiaries of U.S. banks from engaging in proprietary
trading abroad, but it has much less justification in seeking to pre-
clude foreign banks from doing so.  At most, it can assert that proprie-
tary trading within the United States endangers its interests.  Thus, the
more limited reach of the Volcker Rule with respect to foreign banks
may be justified.
Put differently, all nations have to worry about whether their own
banks will fail.  But they need not worry about the failure of a foreign
financial institution simply because it operates on their soil unless its
failure will injure domestic counterparties.  The historic mistake in
the AIG story was the failure to recognize that its insolvency could
injure counterparties worldwide.  But that is the exception, not the
rule (as next explained).  Precisely because all nations have to inter-
nalize the costs of their own banks failing, there is less of a public-
goods problem here that could justify United States rules regulating
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offshore proprietary trading by a foreign bank simply because it has
some presence in the United States.
A second and independent justification also supports this distinc-
tion between OTC swaps trading and proprietary trading and further
explains why the AIG example was the exception and not the rule.
Realistically, it is only in the context of over-the-counter trading (and
particularly the trading of long-term contracts, such as credit default
swaps) that the failure of a foreign counterparty seems capable of
causing the failure of the domestic financial institution that is its
counterparty.  In contrast, most proprietary trading in equities will
occur on exchanges.  Around the world, such trading is already
cleared through clearinghouses (or similar institutions) that eliminate
(or at least mitigate) the counterparty risk.138  The distinctive feature
about swaps was the absence of a clearinghouse or exchange, with the
result that counterparty risk was a serious problem.  This was the fac-
tor that made AIG’s collapse so devastating that it required a bailout.
Even after Dodd-Frank, counterparty risk survives in the case of OTC
trading, at least when the swap is too customized to be cleared or
traded on an exchange.  Thus, in the context addressed by Title VII of
the Dodd-Frank Act, counterparties could impose potentially ban-
krupting losses on a U.S. financial institution, but that same scenario
is far less likely in the case of proprietary trading, where the
counterparty risk is minimal.  As a generalization, in the case of pro-
prietary trading, the securities may be risky to their owner, but one
counterparty’s failure could seldom, if ever, destroy the other, at least
when an exchange stands between them.  Thus, the United States has
much less of a need to regulate the foreign counterparty in the con-
text of proprietary trading.
To return to a central theme, the key to the public-goods prob-
lem in the international context is that some jurisdictions need not
internalize the costs of a financial contagion.  In the OTC-derivatives
context, a small nation may sponsor a dangerous financial casino
where all who trade are at risk.  To be sure, we have not in the past
witnessed such behavior by any nation, but that was because before
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, swaps trading was essentially un-
regulated everywhere.  In the future, such a scenario of smaller na-
tions offering financial casinos because they face little downside risk
remains plausible—unless the major players (i.e., the United States
and the EU) bar their own financial institutions from trading in them.
Nonetheless, once we move outside this context of OTC derivatives,
138 See Luettringhaus, supra note 38, at 20 (“[S]tandardized exchange-traded deriva- R
tives contracts are transparent with regard to pricing, volume, the parties involved and
their respective positions . . . . [and] are subject to initial and variation margin require-
ments . . . .”).
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the United States has less reason to regulate foreign counterparties.
Unquestionably, the United States still has an interest in regulating
the offshore activities of its own banks (and their subsidiaries and affil-
iates).  But, reckless activity by a non-U.S. bank offshore (even though
it has some presence in the United States) seems generally unlikely to
impose significant costs on the United States, unless the scale of the
foreign bank’s activities in the United States is very large.  Here, the
Dodd-Frank Act may reach too far; indeed, some have argued that the
banking industry deliberately caused the overextension of the Volcker
Rule in a covert attempt to make the rule unenforceable.139
The bottom line, then, is that the case for the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Volcker Rule to foreign banks is limited.  It should
extend only to the offshore activities of U.S. banks (and their subsidi-
aries and affiliates)—and possibly to foreign banks with a major pres-
ence in the United States.  Only to the extent that a counterparty’s
failure can endanger a U.S. institution does a basis exist (even under
the statutory language of the Dodd-Frank Act)140 for the United States
to bar the foreign entity from proprietary trading.  Thus, even if the
foreign bank’s trading activities were planned and orchestrated in the
United States, they do not seem likely to threaten the safety and
soundness of the United States’s financial markets.  All this suggests
that financial regulators largely got it right in defining the extraterri-
torial scope of the Volcker Rule to cover U.S. banks globally but for-
eign banks only on a territorial basis.
CONCLUSION: THE FISSURES UNDER THE “SOFT LAW” PARADIGM
Put bluntly, the efforts of both the SEC and the CFTC to regulate
OTC derivatives to contain systemic risk have fallen short, frustrated
139 See Onaran, supra note 120 (“U.S. banks pushed regulators to widen proposed re- R
strictions on trading and hedge-fund ownership by foreign firms, then encouraged govern-
ments around the world to complain about the rule’s reach.  The two-pronged lobbying
strategy resulted in foreign officials joining U.S. lenders to push back against the Volcker
rule.”).  No position is taken by this Essay on this claim that banks sought to sabotage the
Volcker Rule in this fashion.
140 Even under section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, an extraterritorial application of
U.S. law is generally precluded unless the “activities” at issue either “(1) have a direct and
significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States” or
“(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe or promulgate
as are necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of any provision of this Act . . .”  In the
case of the Volcker Rule, it is difficult to argue that either precondition is satisfied simply
because a foreign bank with a U.S. presence engages in some proprietary trading.  To
illustrate, if a non-U.S. bank with a small branch office in the United States engages in
proprietary trading in Europe (with the order being originated in New York), it seems self-
evident that on this basis alone one cannot conclude that such trading will have any “direct
or significant connection with . . . or effect on” the U.S.  Dodd-Frank Act § 722(d), 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(i) (2012).  Nor is it clear that a rule against such trading outside the United States is
needed to prevent evasion where no U.S.-domiciled bank is a party to it.
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by their inability (or unwillingness) to reach extraterritorial end runs
around their rules.  By using foreign subsidiaries whose obligations
the parent institution does not guarantee, U.S. banks have the ability
to behave as recklessly as AIG did in 2008.  In a panic, these “un-
guaranteed” subsidiaries could topple, like falling dominoes, taking
their counterparts down with them.
The lesson from this regulatory shortfall is, above all, that interna-
tional financial regulation cannot continue as before.  In the past, fi-
nancial regulation was thought best left to independent and
sophisticated technocrats, who needed to be “protected from the dis-
torting influences of politics.”141  Today, financial regulation is prov-
ing too important to be left to the technocrats.  As others have
described, the old model of independent technocratic expertise ap-
pears to be waning, with the shift being toward “greater political in-
volvement in postcrisis banking regulation around the world.”142
With this shift, the traditional style of international soft law is also be-
coming obsolete.  Once soft-law standards were framed by transna-
tional regulatory networks, populated by independent technocrats, in
which elected governments participated to only a modest degree (if at
all).143  This process typically framed broad general principles and
suggested voluntary best practices, but its output was not binding.  In
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the need for binding legal rules is
now clear, but their arrival has been delayed by a variety of factors.
Chief among these is the claimed need for harmonization.  Indeed,
that need is increasingly invoked by, and has become the most effec-
tive weapon of, those seeking to delay systemic-risk reform.  Harmoni-
zation is no longer the neutral goal it once seemed, but  the need for
international collaboration is even greater.  This Essay has suggested
that the best compromise is minilateralism and bilateral or small-
group negotiations.  From this perspective, the initial question should
be: what is the minimum number of nations that need to agree?  In
the world of OTC derivatives, an agreement between the United
States and Europe would effectively compel the rest of the world to
conform to their agreed standards.
The dangers inherent in substituted compliance arise not simply
because the financial services industry wishes to escape confining reg-
141 See Gadinis, supra note 12, at 158. R
142 See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 327, 332 (2013).
143 See Gadinis, supra note 12, at 162.  For traditional descriptions of this process of R
formulating voluntary transnational norms, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in
a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 518 (1995); David Zaring, Rulemaking and
Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 576 (2007–2008). See
also How International Financial Law Works, supra note 5, at 304–11 (analyzing international R
financial law in light of the hard law/soft law dichotomy).
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ulation but equally because nations move at different speeds.  The
United States has moved more quickly than Europe (or other nations)
to implement systemic-risk reforms for a variety of reasons.  Given the
more fragmented nature of Europe, a slower decision-making process
was predictable and will likely continue.  Elsewhere, some nations may
wish to see what the United States does before they act; others may
fear taking a bold position if the United States does not follow; still
others are just stalemated or indifferent.  For all these reasons, the
U.S. rules will typically come first and remain stricter than those of
other nations.  Thus, when U.S. regulators find that another jurisdic-
tion’s rules are functionally equivalent for purposes of substituted
compliance, a significant margin will still likely persist between the
strictness of the U.S. rules and those of the other jurisdiction.  At that
point, an incentive arises for U.S. financial institutions to move opera-
tions and personnel to that other jurisdiction to operate under its
more-relaxed and lower-cost regime.  Over time, such regulatory arbi-
trage will imply job loss and a decline in market share for the United
States.
The resulting injury to the United States is twofold: (1) to the
extent its financial institutions can operate under less strict rules
abroad, it is more exposed to systemic risk; and (2) jobs and opera-
tions will migrate from the United States.  In the past, the United
States has occasionally deregulated in the hopes of spurring job crea-
tion,144 but in this instance deregulation through substituted compli-
ance uniquely implies job loss.  Eventually, this loss may become
pronounced, but at that point the financial services industry will re-
spond that the United States should deregulate more sweepingly to
reduce the disparity, in effect leveling down to the lowest common
denominator.  Any such deregulation could place the United States
back on the road to another 2008 financial crisis.
What then is the answer?  A minilateral negotiation is more likely
to reduce the disparity between the rules of the United States and the
other jurisdictions participating in the negotiation.  To be sure, this is
a matter of degree, not kind.  In contrast, a multilateral approach that
results in nonbinding principles of soft law will likely give rise to a
greater disparity between the United States’s rules and the operative
rules of other nations.  Even worse, agreement on broad (but empty)
principles of soft law may obligate the United States to recognize all
those regimes that are in asserted compliance with those loose inter-
national standards as qualifying for substituted compliance.
144 The leading recent example is the JOBS Act (an acronym for “Jumpstart Our Busi-
ness Startups”), which was passed in 2012.  For a review, see generally Michael D. Gutten-
tag, Protection From What?  Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207
(2013).
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A key virtue of the minilateral alternative is that, because the
United States and the EU effectively dominate derivatives trading,
they would have the leverage to specify joint criteria for derivatives
trading.  If they can agree, they could insist that their financial institu-
tions (and their offshore affiliates) not trade anywhere on a basis in-
consistent with their joint criteria.  Here, “hard law” would vastly
outperform soft law.  As a second step, they could take their agreed-
upon criteria to bodies such as the Financial Standards Board and the
G-20, where the major financial nations dominate.145  Here, minority
vetoes and holdouts are less likely to have an impact, and thus soft law
could be better shaped.  Only as a final step should the issue be placed
on the agenda of larger, global bodies (where passive resistance by the
likely free riders is more likely).
To sum up, there are two bad policy options: First, treating con-
sensus as a precondition to regulation arms the opponents of financial
regulation with a powerful weapon by which to veto through delay.146
Second, deferring to the rules of other legal systems simply because
they are within a stone’s throw of those of the United States (as a
policy of substituted compliance may entail) will encourage both de-
lay and regulatory arbitrage.  Predictably, U.S. market share will de-
cline, and U.S. jobs will move abroad.  To avert this, the United States
and EU need proactively to seek to shape a global consensus—without
awaiting its arrival as a prerequisite.
At present, it is clear that U.S. financial regulators do not really
agree but will not acknowledge the inconsistency in their diverging
approaches.  On one hand, the SEC favors (and the CFTC has belat-
edly accepted) a policy of substituted compliance.  On the other
hand, the Federal Reserve Board continues to disdain or ignore this
policy.  Indeed, the Federal Reserve Board has not only imposed the
145 Persons on both sides of this debate have recognized that the United States and the
EU should “reenergize the G-20 as the pre-eminent global forum on financial reform” and
“launch a comprehensive program aimed at bilaterally coordinating implementation of
their reforms across regulatory agencies.” CHRIS BRUMMER, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE:
TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL REFORM & THE G20 AGENDA 4  (2013).  Although I would not
suggest that the G-20 become a super-regulator, able to review and revise the policies of the
SEC or the CFTC, agendas are important and need to be reaffirmed or revised.
146 As of the summer of 2013, the financial services industry was attacking the CFTC
on precisely this ground.  In early August 2013, following the CFTC’s negotiations with the
EU, thirty-five members of the House of Representatives wrote to urge the SEC and the
CFTC to reconsider their policies on cross-border swaps trading, arguing that “unilateral
application of U.S. derivatives regulations to other countries that are presently working on
their own complementary derivatives regulatory regimes will result in a flight of swaps activ-
ity away from U.S. banks overseas . . . .”  Jim Hamilton, House Members Urge SEC and CFTC to
Harmonize Derivatives Regulations Both Domestically and Globally, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD SEC.
REG. (Nov. 15, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/house-
members-urge-sec-and-cftc-to.html.  This is an unsurprising example of the industry’s fa-
vorite tactic of insisting on delay and complete consensus before regulation can become
effective.
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Volcker Rule on U.S. banks on a worldwide basis but it has also just
insisted that large foreign banks meet the higher U.S. standards on
capital adequacy and leverage.147  Unlike the SEC or the CFTC, the
Federal Reserve seems impervious to foreign pressure that it conform
to international standards.148  Potentially, this could also cause some
foreign financial institutions to flee the U.S. market (again with conse-
quent job loss), and that is another reason why a minilateral approach
(and eventual common rules) is more desirable.
The cause of curbing systemic risk has no natural champion and
many natural enemies.  One of the most commonly made observa-
tions about public goods is that they tend to be underprovided (be-
cause those who use or rely on them can escape paying for them).149
147 On February 18, 2014, the Federal Reserve Board published a final rule (issued
pursuant to section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act) requiring large foreign banks to keep high
levels of capital in their U.S. units and to establish a U.S. intermediate holding company
(which would be supervised by the Federal Reserve Board) over those units if the foreign
banking organization has $50 billion or more in the United States. See Federal Reserve
System, Regulation YY, Docket No. 1438 (RIN 7100-AD-86), Enhanced Prudential Stan-
dards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations (2014).  The rule
further requires covered foreign banking organizations to maintain more risk-absorbing
capital and hold a minimum of 4% of total assets in equity capital. See Isabel Gomez & Eyk
Henning, Deutsche Bank to Cut U.S. Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB30001424052702304610404579402631458481904.  Pre-
dictably, the Fed’s action elicited European opposition, but the Federal Reserve was un-
moved. See Francesco Guerrera, Current Account: Banking on Move by Fed as Top Cop, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 25, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702
304834704579402740494142258; Ryan Tracy, Fed Move Rattles Global Bank Talks, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 20, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023036
36404579395272228933840 (quoting Michel Barnier that Fed action was “‘decided unilat-
erally’”). But see Tarullo, supra note 16 (rejecting these arguments).
148 In its February 18, 2014 order, the Federal Reserve Board did acknowledge that
some commentators had urged it to rely on a system of substituted compliance for foreign
banking organizations, but explained that under section 165 it was instructed to focus on
the foreign banking organization’s activities in the United States and their potential im-
pact on the U.S. financial system. See Federal Reserve System, Regulation YY, Docket No.
1438 (RIN 7100-AD-86), Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies
and Foreign Banking Organizations, at § IV(A)(4)(b) (2014).  But this argument applies
equally well to the SEC and CFTC, as foreign regulators have not focused on how swaps
trading by U.S. and foreign swap dealers might affect U.S. financial stability.
Why is the Federal Reserve uniquely able to maintain its independence and resist the
pressure for substituted compliance?  Possibly, the Federal Reserve Board is more indepen-
dent because it is less accountable to Congress (which does not fund it).  Alternatively, it
also lent heavily to shore up foreign banks in 2008 and may better perceive the risks.  In
addition, it is also independent of other central banks.  The Federal Reserve Board’s re-
cent action with respect to foreign banks was in sharp contrast to the recent decision by UK
banking authorities to relax their rules for foreign banks in order to attract them back to
London. See Margot Patrick, U.K. Regulator Poised to Change Rules for Foreign Banks, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038
80604579403194293703128.
149 For a representative assessment, see Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts
and Facilities: Information As a Common Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 120
(2003) (noting that the temptation to free ride “will lead to a suboptimal investment in
improving the resource, monitoring use, and sanctioning rule-breaking behavior”).  Here,
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Protection against systemic risk is a public good, and, for the future,
the great danger is that it will be underprovided.  In all likelihood,
failure will not be caused by forthright opposition to reform but
rather by delay, piecemeal compromise, and low-visibility decisions
that eviscerate the formal rules.  The public has a short memory, but
the industry never forgets.
this means too few resources will be committed to protecting against systemic risk, includ-
ing through law enforcement.
